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Abstract
The event of ruin (bankruptcy) has long been a core concept of risk management
interest in the literature of actuarial science. There are two major research lines.
The rst one focuses on distributional studies of some crucial ruin-related variables
such as the decit at ruin or the time to ruin. The second one focuses on dynamically
controlling the probability that ruin occurs by imposing controls such as investment,
reinsurance, or dividend payouts. The content of the thesis will be in line with the
second research direction, but under a relaxed denition of ruin, for the reason that
ruin is often too harsh a criteria to be implemented in practice.
Relaxation of the concept of ruin through the consideration of "exotic ruin" fea-
tures, including for instance, ruin under discrete observations, Parisian ruin setup,
two-sided exit framework, and drawdown setup, received considerable attention in
recent years. While there has been a rich literature on the distributional studies
of those new features in insurance surplus processes, comparably less contributions
have been made to dynamically controlling the corresponding risk. The thesis pro-
poses to analytically study stochastic control problems related to some "exotic ruin"
features in the broad area of insurance and nance.
In particular, in Chapter 3, we study an optimal investment problem by mini-
mizing the probability that a signicant drawdown occurs. In Chapter 4, we take
this analysis one step further by proposing a general drawdown-based penalty struc-
ture, which include for example, the probability of drawdown considered in Chapter
3 as a special case. Subsequently, we apply it in an optimal investment problem of
maximizing a fund managers expected cumulative income. Moreover, in Chapter 5
we study an optimal investment-reinsurance problem in a two-sided exit framework.
All problems mentioned above are considered in a random time horizon. Although
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the random time horizon is mainly determined by the nature of the problem, we
point out that under suitable assumptions, a random time horizon is analytically
more tractable in comparison to its nite deterministic counterpart.
For each problem considered in Chapters 35, we will adopt the dynamic pro-
gramming principle (DPP) to derive a partial di¤erential equation (PDE), com-
monly referred to as a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in the literature,
and subsequently show that the value function of each problem is equivalent to a
strong solution to the associated HJB equation via a verication argument. The
remaining problem is then to solve the HJB equations explicitly. We will develop
a new decomposition method in Chapter 3, which decomposes a nonlinear second-
order ordinary di¤erential equation (ODE) into two solvable nonlinear rst-order
ODEs. In Chapters 4 and 5, we use the Legendre transform to build respectively
one-to-one correspondence between the original problem and its dual problem, with
the latter being a linear free boundary problem that can be solved in explicit forms.
It is worth mentioning that additional di¢ culties arise in the drawdown related
problems of Chapters 3 and 4 for the reason that the underlying problems involve
the maximum process as an additional dimension. We overcome this di¢ culty by
utilizing a dimension reduction technique.
Chapter 6 will be devoted to the study of an optimal investment-reinsurance
problem of maximizing the expected mean-variance utility function, which is a
typical time-inconsistent problem in the sense that DPP fails. The problem is then
formulated as a non-cooperative game, and a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
subsequently solved. The thesis is nally ended with some concluding remarks and
some future research directions in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
A nancial institution imposes controls stochastically on its wealth (assets) to
achieve certain objectives. For instance, an integrated reinsurance and investment
strategy is commonly employed by an insurance company for the purpose of increas-
ing its underwriting capacity, stabilizing the underwriting results, protecting itself
against catastrophic losses, and achieving nancial growth. Failing to monitor the
wealth process properly may lead to undesirable events such as bankruptcy, even for
large institutions that are normally labelled as "too big to fall". A typical example
is the collapse of the American Insurance Group and Lehman Brothers in the 2008
nancial crisis, which were once respectively the largest insurance company and the
fourth largest investment bank in the U.S..
The actuarial community has long been focusing on modelling the event of
ruin (bankruptcy) and characterizing some crucial ruin-related variables such as
the probability of ruin and the time to ruin. The reader is referred to Asmussen
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and Albrecher [9] or Landriault et al. [61] and references therein for a comprehen-
sive review on ruin theory. In addition to knowing the distributional properties of
ruin-related variables, it is equally important for the actuarial community to gain
knowledge on how to reduce the risk of ruin by implementing controls. This mo-
tivates another research line that focuses on dynamically controlling ruin-related
variables such as the ruin probability. For instance, Young [88] studied an optimal
investing problem of minimizing the probability of ruin over a lifetime period under
the Black-Scholes framework from the point view of individuals, which is commonly
referred to as a lifetime ruin problem. Her work is followed by several variants in-
cluding but not limited to adding borrowing constraints (e.g., Bayraktar and Young
[25]), assuming various types of consumption (e.g., Bayraktar and Young [26]), un-
der stochastic volatility (e.g., Bayraktar et al. [21]), under ambiguity aversion (see,
Bayraktar and Zhang [28]), and allowing changes of model parameters subject to a
shock (see, Moore and Young [75]). Another example is given by Schmidli [80] and
Promislow and Young [78], which are two relatively early contributions on studying
the problem of minimizing ruin probability by controlling investment and/or rein-
surance strategies from the view point of insurance companies. Their works were
later extended by Bai and Guo [14] to multiple assets with short-selling constraints,
Luo et al. [69] with borrowing constraints, and Bai et al. [13] to a bivariate reserve
process. The content of this thesis is mostly in line with the work on stochasti-
cally controlling the probability of ruin, but with the concept of ruin relaxed (as
is introduced in the next paragraph). Also, note that there are other types of ac-
tuarial related stochastic control problems which have been studied over the years,
such as the expected utility maximization of insurers (e.g., Zou and Cadenillas [96]
[97]), the cumulative dividend payout maximization (e.g., Asmussen and Taksar
[10], Marciniak and Palmowski [71]), and various problems in life insurance (e.g.,
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Iwaki and Osaki [54], Kronborg and Ste¤ensen [57], Mousa et al. [76]). The reader
is referred to the aforementioned references for a more detailed review of this body
of literature.
Recently, the concept of ruin was relaxed through the consideration of some
"exotic ruin" features, including for instance, ruin under discrete observations (e.g.,
Albrecher et al. [2]), Parisian ruin setup (e.g., Loe¤en et al. [68]), two-sided
exit framework (e.g., Li et al. [63]), and drawdown setup (e.g., Landriault et
al. [59]). For example, drawdown, which measures the current level of a process
to its historical running maximum, is of particular interest for risk management
purposes. In practice, a nancial institution is suggested to monitor its wealth
process and take actions correspondingly based on drawdown-related events rather
than the event of ruin, for the obvious reason that ruin is too harsh a criteria
that usually leads to the termination of the business. Due to its importance, there
has been a rich literature on distributional studies of drawdown-related quantities
and the reader is referred to Landriault et al. [60] and references therein for the
most recent developments and a complete literature review. However, on the other
hand, not much attention has been paid to controlling drawdown-related quantities
dynamically. We are thus motivated to model and subsequently study stochastic
control problems that involve exotic ruin features such as drawdown in Chapter
3 and 4. In addition, another stochastic control problem under a two-sided exit
framework will be studied in Chapter 5 for similar reasons. This serves as the rst
main objective of the thesis.
In general, a stochastic control problem can be classied into three categories
based on the time horizon it ts in, i.e., innite time horizon, nite determin-
istic time horizon, and nite random time horizon. The time horizon is usually
determined by the problems nature. For instance, the classical consumption and
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investment problems (e.g., Merton [73]) are set in a nite denite time horizon; the
lifetime ruin problem (e.g., Young [88]) mentioned above is set in a nite random
horizon for the reason that any individual investor is subject to a nonnegligible mor-
tality rate; for studies on asymptotic investment strategies of funds (e.g., Guasoni
and Obloj [52]), an innite time horizon is usually assumed to reect the long-term
feature. For stochastic control problems sitting in an innite time horizon, a fairly
general result is given by Bäuerle and Bayraktar [20], which showed that for a
controlled di¤usion process, an optimal solution to problems of minimizing hitting
probabilities such as the probability of ruin in an innite time horizon, is the one
that maximizes the ratio of drift to volatility squared. For problems in the other
two categories, additional di¢ culties are introduced due to the loss of some nice
properties such as time homogeneity, and the analysis for each problem is usually
carried out separately. The thesis will embrace the challenge and focus on solving
stochastic control problems with a nite random time horizon (Chapters 35) and
a nite deterministic time horizon (Chapter 6).
A primary goal of solving a stochastic optimal control problem is to charac-
terize the value function, i.e., the optimal value of the objective function, and an
optimal control that leads to it. A classical and powerful way to attain this goal
is by utilizing the dynamic programming principle (DPP). The method typically
leads to an associated partial di¤erential equation (PDE) or ordinary di¤erential
equation (ODE) satised by the value function, which is commonly referred to as
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation or dynamic programming equation in
the literature. However, the derivation of the HJB equation is heuristic in the sense
that it relies on several assumptions of the unknown value function such as twice
continuously di¤erentiability, which in most cases are di¢ cult to verify in advance.
To be mathematically rigorous, the procedure of showing equivalence between the
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value function and a solution to the associated HJB equation is commonly reverted
by stating and subsequently proving a verication theorem. In other words, in-
stead of showing that the value function satises the HJB equation, one shows that
a strong (su¢ ciently smooth) solution (if exists) to the HJB equation is equiva-
lent to the value function. Though the verication procedure is straightforward, it
requires an explicit characterization of a strong solution to the HJB equation.
The verication procedure is adopted repeatedly in all problems considered in
this thesis. The drawback mentioned above should not be a source of concern for
the reason that an explicit strong solution to the HJB equation associated with
each problem can be obtained (as we will see in later chapters). The reader should
be aware that the focus of this thesis is then on solving the HJB equations, which
generally speaking can be mathematically challenging. The challenge arises from
the nature of the HJB equation, i.e., a second order nonlinear parabolic PDE, and
such equations in general should be solved on a case-by-case basis. We would like to
take the challenge and contribute to expanding the class of solvable HJB equations
by utilizing existing approaches and/or developing new approaches. This serves as
the second main objective of the thesis.
Although beyond the scope of the thesis, it is important to note that the lack
of smoothness of the value function is quite common, which for instance can be
caused by restricting the value of the controls in a closed interval. In such cases,
the theory of viscosity solution, which is a weak formulation of solutions, steps in
naturally. One then shows directly (by circumventing Itos formula) that the value
function is the solution (in viscosity sense) to the HJB equation. The reader is
referred to Crandall et al. [44] and references therein for an excellent survey on
viscosity solutions.
Moreover, it is also crucial to note that the failure of DPP, which is commonly
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referred to as time inconsistency in the literature, may occur under some circum-
stances. The failure can be caused by various reasons such as the form of the
objective function. A typical example is given when the objective is to maximize a
mean variance utility function. In the literature, there are mainly two approaches
to tackle the time inconsistency. The rst approach solves for an optimal strategy
by optimizing the objective function based on todays information only, which is
known as pre-commitment (e.g., Bäuerle [19], Bai and Zhang [16]). The strategy
will be applied even if it no longer optimizes the objective function at a later time.
Even though the approach is economically meaningful, the issue of time inconsis-
tency is not really addressed. The second approach formulates the problem as a
non-cooperative game, and a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is subsequently
solved. In other words, at every time point, there exists a player who solves for an
equilibrium strategy by treating the decision-making as a game against all future
players. The equilibrium strategies are thus time-consistent. The approach can be
traced back to Strotz [84], and has recently been further developed by Björk and
Murgoci [29] for a general class of objective functions in a Markovian framework.
There are other works along the research direction dealing with problems under spe-
cic model setups; see, e.g., Ekeland and Lazrak [48], Basak and Chabakauri [18],
and Czichowsky [47]. The second approach will be adopted in Chapter 6 to solve
a stochastic control problem under the objective of maximizing a mean variance
utility function.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is a collection of four research projects and is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 is devoted to introducing the mathematical preliminaries. Chapters 36
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are respectively devoted to solving a specic stochastic optimal control problems
of interest in the broad area of insurance and/or nance. Finally, in Chapter 7, we
end the thesis with concluding remarks and a brief discussion on future research
directions. The motivation, the methodology, and the main results of each problem
as well as the connections among them are specied as follows.
In Chapter 3, we study an optimal investing problem of minimizing the prob-
ability that a signicant drawdown occurs over a lifetime investment. In the fund
management industry, drawdown is interpreted as a measurement of the decline
of portfolio value from its historic high-water mark (running maximum) (see, e.g.,
Figure 2.1). It is a frequently quoted risk metric to evaluate the performance of
portfolio managers via performance measures such as the Calmar ratio and the
Sterling ratio; see, e.g., Schuhmacher and Eling [81] for a list of existing drawdown-
based performance measures. Drawdown focuses primarily on extreme downward
risks (as opposed to other standard risk measures such as volatility and Beta),
making it particularly relevant for risk management purposes. Also, drawdown can
easily be measured and interpreted by both portfolio managers and clients. A sig-
nicant drawdown not only leads to large portfolio losses but may also trigger a
long-term recession. Bailey and Prado [17] recently provided some justication to
the so-called triple penance rule, where the recovery period was shown to be on
average three times as long as the time to produce a drawdown. Also, drawdown is
considered a key determinant of sustainable investments as investors tend to overes-
timate their tolerance to risk. For instance, a sharp drop in portfolios value is often
accompanied by investors exercising their fund redemption options. Moreover, in-
vestors tend to assess their investment success by comparing their current portfolio
value to the historical maximum value. This resulted in much hardship during the
global nancial crisis of 2008 when substantial drops in portfolio value were expe-
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rienced across the board. Therefore, portfolio managers have strong incentives to
adopt strategies with low drawdown risks (and more stable growth rate).
Figure 2.1. Examples of drawdown at di¤erent time points
Optimal investing problems related to drawdown risks have long focused on
maximizing the long-term (asymptotic) growth rate of a portfolio subject to a
strict drawdown constraint. Grossman and Zhou [50] pioneered the research topic
by considering a market model with a risky asset and a risk-free asset in the Black-
Scholes framework. This problem has been extended to a multi-asset framework and
a general semimartingale framework by Cvitanic and Karatzas [46] and Cherny and
Obloj [42], respectively. Klass and Nowicki [56] later showed that the strategy pro-
posed by Grossman and Zhou [50] is not always optimal in a discrete-time setting.
Moreover, the objective to maximize the long-term growth rate has been criticized
because any strategy which coincides with the optimal strategy of Grossman and
Zhou [50] after any xed time is optimal. Roche [79] studied the innite-horizon
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optimal consumption-investment problem for a power utility subject to the same
drawdown constraint. Elie and Touzi [49] later extended Roche [79] to a general
class of utility functions. Portfolio optimization problems with drawdown con-
straints are also considered in discrete-time settings (see, e.g., Chekhlov et al. [41]
and Alexander and Baptista [3]).
The work appearing in Chapter 3 proposes to minimize the lifetime drawdown
probability rather than impose a strict drawdown constraint, as is commonly done
in the literature. This is because a strict drawdown constraint may not be attainable
in some contexts (such as in the models developed in Chapter 3). In particular,
under the Black-Scholes framework, we examine two nancial market models: a
market with two risky assets, and a market with a risk-free asset and a risky asset.
Closed-form optimal trading strategies are derived under both models by utilizing
a decomposition technique on the associated HJB equation. We show that it is
optimal to minimize the portfolio variance when the fund value is at its historic
high-water mark. Moreover, when the fund value drops, the proportion of wealth
invested in the asset with a higher instantaneous rate of return should be increased.
We also nd that the instantaneous return rate of the minimum lifetime drawdown
probability (MLDP) portfolio is never less than the return rate of the minimum
variance (MV) portfolio. This supports the practical use of drawdown-based per-
formance measures in which the role of volatility is replaced by drawdown.
In Chapter 4, we take the analysis one step further by proposing a general
drawdown-based penalty structure. Under the proposed structure, investorsdif-
ferent degrees of aversion toward drawdown risks are captured by the embedded
drawdown-based penalty functions. The general structure includes the drawdown
probability considered in Chapter 3 and the expected time spent in drawdown con-
sidered in Angoshtari et al. [5] as special cases. Subsequently, we study an optimal
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investing problem of maximizing a fund managers expected cumulative income over
a lifetime investment period given that his/her income is determined by a particular
penalty structure. To be more specic, a penalty (deduction in income rate) will
be incurred once a predetermined drawdown level is reached, and the severity of
the deduction is characterized by the related penalty function.
Under a market model consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky asset, we study
in particular a constant penalty structure and a linear penalty structure. The
two structures are of practical interest as they are consistent in spirit with the
Calmar ratio (built on maximum drawdown) and the Sterling ratio (built on average
drawdown), respectively, which are two frequently quoted performance measures in
the nancial industry. In both cases, closed-form expressions for the maximized
cumulative income (MCI) and the MCI trading strategy are obtained by applying
a dual approach. We nd that in the nonpenalty region, the MCI strategy is
equivalent to the MLDP strategy developed in Chapter 3, and as the fund level
drops, the manager intends to invest more aggressively by increasing the proportion
of wealth invested in the risky asset. However, in the penalty region, the manager
can either be more or less aggressive depending on the particular choice of the
penalty function.
In Chapter 5, we study a pair of optimal reinsurance-investment strategies un-
der the two-sided exit framework which aims to (1) maximize the probability that
the surplus reaches the target b before ruin occurs over the time horizon [0; e]
(where e is an independent exponentially distributed random time); (2) minimize
the probability that ruin occurs before the surplus reaches the target b over the
time horizon [0; e]. A strong motivation to consider objectives (1) and (2) stems
from the crucial role the two-sided exit probabilities P ( b <  0 ^ ejXu0 = x) and
P ( 0 <  b ^ ejXu0 = x) play in the analysis of insurance risk processes (e.g., spec-
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trally negative Lévy processes and Markov-additive processes), and many recently
proposed exotic ruin models. For the latter, we specically mention the work on
the discretely-observed ruin model (e.g., Albrecher et al. [2]), the loss-carry-forward
tax model (e.g., Li et al. [63]), and the Parisian ruin model (e.g., Loe¤en et al.
[68]), to name a few.
The two-sided exit objectives (1) and (2) are closely related to earlier contribu-
tions made on the objective of minimizing a given ruin probability or reaching a
bequest goal. Indeed, Promislow and Young [78] studied the optimal reinsurance-
investment problem under the objective of minimizing the innite-time ruin prob-
ability (i.e., a special case of objective (2) with b = 1 and  = 0). Under the
same innite-time horizon framework, Luo et al. [69] and Bai and Guo [14] further
extended the work of Promislow and Young [78] by considering short-selling con-
straints and the presence of multiple risky assets, respectively. The objectives (1)
and (2) are also in spirit related to the objective (3) of reaching a bequest goal,
namely, supu P
 
Xue^0  b
Xu0 = x, see, e.g., Bayraktar and Young [27] and ref-
erences therein. A major di¤erence between (3) and the two-sided exit objectives
(1) and (2) is that the game in (3) ends at e ^  0, while the game in (1) and (2)
ends at the earlier time  0^ b^e. Another di¤erence is that Bayraktar and Young
[27] considered the lifetime investment problem of an individual investor, while the
focus of this paper is on the optimal reinsurance-investment problem of an insurer.
See, for instance, Pestien and Sudderth [77], Karatzas [55], Browne [32][33][34], and
Bayraktar et al. [24] for other related papers on the optimal control of an investors
wealth to reach a given level.
The work appearing in Chapter 5 assumes that the insurer can purchase pro-
portional reinsurance and invest its wealth in a nancial market consisting of a
risk-free asset and a risky asset, where the dynamics of the latter is assumed to
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be correlated with the insurance surplus. By solving the associated HJB equation
via a dual argument, an explicit expression for the optimal reinsurance-investment
strategy is obtained. We nd that the optimal strategy of objective (1) (objective
(2) resp.) is always more aggressive (conservative resp.) than the strategy of mini-
mizing the innite-time ruin probability of Promislow and Young [78]. Due to the
presence of the time factor e, the optimal strategy under objective (1) or (2) may
lead to more aggressive positions as the wealth level increases, a behavior which
may be more consistent with industry practices.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the study of an optimal reinsurance-investment prob-
lem for an insurer under a mean-variance criterion in a dynamic setting. Two
types of reinsurance policies are most commonly studied in the literature of opti-
mal reinsurance-investment problems under a mean-variance criterion, i.e., propor-
tional (quota-share) reinsurance (see, e.g., Zeng and Li [89], Shen and Zeng [82])
and excess-of-loss reinsurance (see, e.g., Gu et al. [51], Zhao et al. [94]). Given
the extensive literature, two questions naturally arise which have not yet received
much attention. 1) Which reinsurance policy (of the two) is a better choice for an
insurer under a mean-variance criterion? 2) Is there another form of reinsurance
policy that is better than both under the same criterion? We are thus motivated to
take one step further by searching for the optimal reinsurance form within the class
of combinations of proportional and excess-of-loss reinsurance policies.
In particular, we assume that the insurer purchases one of the two combinations
(type I or type II) of proportional and excess-of-loss reinsurance policies. Under a
mean-variance criterion, the reinsurance-investment problem is time-inconsistent in
the sense that DPP fails. We then formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game
and solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Under a spectrally negative Lévy
insurance model, we obtain the explicit equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy
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by solving the extended HJB equation associated with type I (type II resp.) policy.
The result shows that the excess-of-loss reinsurance is the optimal reinsurance form
within the combined class of type I and type II reinsurance policies.
Finally, it is important to note that each of the Chapters 36 corresponds to a
research project, which was written independently of each other. Although e¤orts
have been made to keep the notation as consistent as possible, some inconsistencies
may remain. The reader is therefore invited to treat each chapter separately from
a notational standpoint.
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Chapter 2
Mathematical Preliminaries
Consider a stochastic process X = fXtgt0 dened on a ltered probability space
(
;F ,fFtgt0;P) satisfying the usual conditions: Let fFXt gt0 denote the natural
ltration generated by X; dened by FXt =  fXs : 0  s  tg : Throughout the
chapter, for convenience, we assume the state space of X is R.
2.1 Lévy Process
Denition 2.1.1 A real-valued stochastic process X = fXtgt0 with Càdlàg paths
dened on a ltered probability space (
;F ,fFtgt0;P) is a Lévy process if
(1) P(X0 = 0) = 1;
(2) for every 0  s  t, Xt Xs is independent of Fs and is identically distrib-
uted as Xt s.
The famous Lévy-Khintchine formula is stated in the following theorem (Theo-
rem 1.6 of Kyprianou [58]), which fully characterizes a Lévy process.
14
Theorem 2.1.1 Suppose that  2 R,  > 0; and v is a measure concentrated on
Rnf0g satisfying Z
R
(x2 ^ 1)v(dx) <1:
From the triplet (; ; v) dene for each s 2 R,
	(s) = is+
1
2
2s2 +
Z
R
(1  eisx + isx1fjxj1g)v(dx):
Then, there exists a probability space (
;F ,fFtgt0;P) on which a Lévy process is
dened with characteristic exponent 	.
The measure v is referred to as Lévy measure in the literature. Lévy processes
form a rich family of processes, including for instance, compound Poisson processes,
Brownian motions, and stable processes, as special cases. The family itself is a
subclass of Markov processes. Moreover, it is well known that a Lévy process
exhibits strong Markov property.
We next introduce the denition the Poisson random measure as it is a conve-
nient tool used to analyze the jump parts of a Lévy process.
Denition 2.1.2 Let (S,S,m) be an arbitrary -nite measure space: N : S !
Z+ [ f0;1g is a Poisson random measure with intensity m if
(1) for any subset B of S, N(B) is a Poisson random variable with parameter
m(B);
(2) for any disjoint subsets B1; B2;    ; Bn of S; N(B1); N(B2),   ; N(Bn) are
independent.
An important subclass of Lévy processes which draws tremendous attention
from the actuarial community is the so-called spectrally negative Lévy processes
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(SNLP), for the reason that a SNLP is particularly well suited to model a surplus
process of an insurance company (as is done in Chapter 6). Spectrally negative
Lévy processes are Lévy processes with v restricted to be a measure on ( 1; 0),
namely, v(0;1) = 0. The SDE of a SNLP X = fXtgt0 can be written as
dXt = dt+ dBt +
Z 0
 1
zN(dz; dt); X0 = 0; (2.1)
where N(dz; dt) is a Poisson random measure with intensity dtv(dz): Alternatively,
SDE (2.1) can be written as
dXt =

+
Z 0
 1
zv(dz)

dt+ dBt +
Z 0
 1
z ~N(dz; dt); X0 = 0; (2.2)
where ~N(dz; dt) := N(dz; dt)   v(dz)dt is the compensated Poisson random mea-
sure.
Note that the study on Lévy processes indeed forms a rich research eld. The
interested reader is referred to, e.g., Kyprianou [58] for a complete review on Lévy
processes with its applications.
2.2 Controlled Lévy Di¤usion Process
The Lévy process (2.2) is a special case of a Lévy di¤usion process. A su¢ cient
condition for the existence and uniqueness of a strong solution to the SDE of a Lévy
di¤usion is given in the following theorem (Theorem 1.19 of Øksendal and Sulem,
Page 10).
Theorem 2.2.1 Consider the following Lévy di¤usion SDE in R: X(0) = x0 2 R
and
dXt = (t;Xt)dt+ (t;Xt)dBt +
Z
R
(t;Xt ; z) ~N(dz; dt); (2.3)
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where  : [0; T ]  R ! R,  : [0; T ]  R ! R and  : [0; T ]  R R ! R satisfy
the following conditions:
(1) there exists a constant C1 <1 such that for all x 2 R,
j(t; x)j2 + j(t; x)j2 +
Z
R
j(t; x; z)j2v(dz)  C1(1 + jxj2); (2.4)
(2) there exists a constant C2 <1 such that for all x; y 2 R,
j(t; x) (t; y)j2+ j(t; x) (t; y)j2+
Z
R
j(t; x; z) (t; y; z)j2v(dz)  C2jx yj2:
(2.5)
Then, there exists a unique cádlág adapted solution Xt such that E [X2t ] < 1 for
all t:
A Lévy di¤usion process X = fXtgt0 under a control U = fUtgt0 is described
by the following SDE
dXt = (t;Xt; Ut)dt+ (t;Xt; Ut)dBt +
Z
R
(Xt ; ut ; z) ~N(dz; dt); X0 = x: (2.6)
The control U is assumed to be cádlág and adapted, valued in U  Rm: All models
developed in Chapters 3-6 will fall into the category of the processes described by
(2.6). To be more specic, Chapters 35 deal with controlled di¤usion processes
(without jumps) and Chapter 6 is dealing with a controlled SNLP.
In most cases, we are interested in Markov controls. A U-valued control U is
called a Markov control if Ut = u(t;Xt) for some measurable function u : [0;1)
R ! U. In particular, if Ut = u(Xt) for some measurable function u : R! U,
then U is called a time homogeneous Markov control. Under a Markov control, a
controlled Lévy di¤usion process stays within the class of Lévy di¤usion processes.
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2.3 Itôs Formula
Itôs formula is one of the most important mathematical tools in stochastic analysis.
In this section, we state Itôs formula for semimartingales, which is its most general
form.
Denition 2.3.1 A stochastic process X = fXtgt0 with state space R is a semi-
martingale if it admits the decomposition
X = X0 +M + A;
where X0 is nite and F0-measurable, M is a local martingale with M0 = 0 and A
is a nite variation process with A0 = 0.
Theorem 2.3.1 Let X = fXtgt0 be a semimartingale with state space R and f
be a C2 function on R. Then f(X) is a semimartingale and
f(Xt) = f(X0) +
Z t
0
fx(Xs )dXs +
1
2
Z t
0
fxx(Xs )dhXcis
+
X
0st
(f(Xs)  f(Xs )  fx(Xs )Xs) ; (2.7)
where fx (fxx resp.) is the rst order (second order resp.) derivative of f with
respect to X.
Note that formula (2.7) will be repeatedly used in the following chapters in the
proof of verication theorems.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Investment to Minimize
the Probability of Lifetime
Drawdown
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the optimization problem of minimizing the prob-
ability that a signicant drawdown occurs over a lifetime investment. Mathe-
matically speaking, our problem is formulated as follows. On a ltered com-
plete probability space (
;F ;F = fFtgt0;P) satisfying the usual conditions,
we consider a F -progressively measurable trading strategy  = ftgt0. The
associated fund value process is denoted by W  = fW t gt0 with initial value
W0 = w > 0. We dene the (oored) running maximum of the fund value at time
t by Mt = max

sup0stW

s ;m
	
with m  w. Note that the initial values w and
m are xed positive constants, and hence are independent of the trading strategy
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. The ratios (Mt   W t )=Mt and W t =Mt are respectively called the relative
drawdown level and the relative fund level at time t. To quantify and measure the
drawdown risk, for a xed signicance level  2 (0; 1), we dene
 = inf ft  0 :Mt  W t > Mt g ;
to be the rst time the relative drawdown of the fund value W  exceeds the signif-
icance level 100%. Equivalently, the event ( > t) for some xed t > 0 implies
that the relative drawdown of the fund value in time period [0; t] never exceeds .
Our main objective is to solve for the optimal trading strategy  = ftgt0
that minimizes the probability that a relative drawdown of size over  occurs before
e, the random time of death of a client with constant force of mortality  > 0, i.e.,
min
2
P f < ejW0 = w;M0 = mg ; (3.1)
where  is the set of admissible trading strategies dened as
 =

 :  is F -progressively measurable and
Z t
0
2sds <1 for any t  0

:
(3.2)
Thus, e is an F-measurable exponentially distributed random variable with mean
1= > 0, independent of the fund value process by assumption. For ease of notation,
we denote the objective function in (3.1) as
 (w;m) = min
2
Pw;m f < eg = min
2
Ew;m[e  ]; (3.3)
where the last equation is due to the independence of  and e. Here and hence-
forth, we write Ew;m[] = E[jW0 = w;M0 = m].
As for other similar optimization problems (e.g., the minimum lifetime ruin
probability (MLRP) of Young [88], Bayraktar and Young [25], Bayraktar and Zhang
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[28] and references therein), we consider the drawdown probability over the lifetime
of a client with a constant force of mortality. For the treatment of non-constant
forces of mortality, one may adopt the approximative scheme of Moore and Young
[74]. Finally, the solution of our resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
does not possess a simple form, which makes its solution form di¢ cult to guess.
Instead, we decompose the HJB equation into two nonlinear equations of rst order
which are solved consecutively.
We point out that a recent paper by Angoshtari et al. [6] also studied the mini-
mum drawdown probability problem but over an innite-time horizon. By utilizing
the results of Bäuerle and Bayraktar [20], the authors found that the minimum
innite-time drawdown probability (MIDP) strategy coincides with the minimum
innite-time ruin probability (MIRP) strategy which consists in maximizing the
ratio of the drift of the value process to its volatility squared. However, we point
out that such a relationship does not hold for a random (or nite) maturity setting
such as in (3.3) as the time-change arguments in Bäuerle and Bayraktar [20] do not
apply.
We will study the MLDP problem (3.3) by examining two di¤erent market
models: a market with two risky assets and a market with a risk-free asset and
a risky asset. It worth pointing out that several conclusions and implications of
market model I are determinant to the subsequent analysis of market model II. Also,
the following nancial implications hold for both market models: (1) it is optimal
to minimize the portfolios variance when the fund value is at its historic high-
water mark; (2) when the fund value drops, it is optimal to increase the proportion
invested in the asset with a higher instantaneous rate of return (even though its
volatility may also be higher). It follows that the instantaneous return rate of
the MLDP strategy is never less than the return rate of the minimum variance
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(MV) strategy, which supports the practical use of drawdown-based performance
measures.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The parallel Sections 3.2 and
3.3 are respectively devoted to the market models I and II. For each model, we
provide a verication theorem, obtain closed-form expressions for the MLDP and
its corresponding optimal trading strategy, as well as prove some properties of the
optimal trading strategy. At the end of each section, we complement the analysis
with some numerical examples.
3.2 Market model I
In this section, we study problem (3.3) under the market model consisting of two
risky assets. We assume that the i-th risky asset (i = 1; 2) is governed by a
geometric Brownian motion with dynamics
dS
(i)
t = iS
(i)
t dt+ iS
(i)
t dB
(i)
t ; S
(i)
0 > 0,
where i 2 R, i > 0, and fB(i)t gt0 is a standard Brownian motion on the ltered
probability space (
;F ;F ;P). In addition, fB(1)t gt0 and fB(2)t gt0 are assumed to
be dependent with
dB
(1)
t dB
(2)
t = dt;
where  2 ( 1; 1) is the correlation coe¢ cient. To avoid triviality, we exclude cases
where the two assets are either perfectly positively or negatively correlated. Given
a trading strategy  2  dened in (3.2), where t represents the fraction of wealth
invested in Asset 1 at time t, the evolution of the fund value processW  is governed
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by
dW t = tW

t
dS
(1)
t
S
(1)
t
+ (1  t)W t
dS
(2)
t
S
(2)
t
= (t1 + (1  t)2)W t dt+ tW t 1dB(1)t + (1  t)W t 2dB(2)t (3.4)
with initial value W0 = w > 0.
3.2.1 Verication theorem
We rst prove a verication theorem for the MLDP. By a dimension reduction, the
MLDP problem (3.3) will later be reduced to a one-dimensional stochastic control
problem.
Let
D =

(w;m) 2 R2 : m (1  )  w  m and m > 0	 ;
and dene a di¤erential operator L ( 2 R) as
Lf = (1 + (1  )2)xfx+
1
2
 
221 + (1  )2 22 + 2 (1  )12

x2fxx f;
where f is a twice-di¤erentiable function in x with fx :=
@f
@x
and fxx :=
@2f
@x2
.
Theorem 3.2.1 Suppose that f : D ! (0; 1] satises the following conditions:
(1) For any xed m > 0, f(;m) 2 C2([m (1  ) ;m]) is strictly decreasing and
strictly convex;
(2) For any xed w > 0, f(w; ) 2 C1 ([w;w= (1  )]) is strictly increasing;
(3) For any xed m > 0 and  2 R, Lf(;m)  0 for w 2 [m (1  ) ;m];
(4) For any xed m > 0, there exists an admissible strategy  : D ! R such
that Lf(;m) = 0 for w 2 [m (1  ) ;m];
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(5) For any m > 0, f(m (1  ) ;m) = 1;
(6) For any m > 0, fm(m;m) = 0.
Then f(w;m) =  (w;m) on D, where  (w;m) is the MLDP dened in (3.3),
and  is the corresponding optimal trading strategy.
Proof. For an admissible trading strategy  satisfying (3.2), we dene a sequence
of stopping time fngn2N with n = inf
n
t  0 : R t
0
2sds  n
o
. By applying Itôs
formula to the process e tf(W t ;M

t ) for t 2 [0; ;n], where ;n :=  ^ n, and
then using (3.4), we arrive at
e 

;nf(W ;n ;M

;n
)  f(w;m)
=  
Z ;n
0
e tf(W t ;M

t )dt+
Z ;n
0
e tfw(W t ;M

t )dW

t
+
1
2
Z ;n
0
e tfww(W t ;M

t )(dW

t )
2 +
Z ;n
0
e tfm(W t ;M

t )dM

t
=
Z ;n
0
e tLf(W t ;Mt )dt+
Z ;n
0
e tfw(W t ;M

t )tW

t 1dB
(1)
t
+
Z ;n
0
e tfw(W t ;M

t )(1  t)W t 2dB(2)t ; (3.5)
Note that the operator Lf(; ) is applied on the argument w of f in (3.5). Also,
the passage from the rst to the second equality in (3.5) was made possible given
that fm(W t ;M

t )dM

t = 0 a.s.. This is because either dM

t = 0 when W

t < M

t
or fm(W t ;M

t ) = 0 when W

t = M

t by condition (6). Taking the conditional
expectation Ew;m[] on both sides of (3.5) and invoking condition (3), we obtain
Ew;m
h
e 

;nf(W ;n ;M

;n
)
i
 f (w;m) ; (3.6)
for all  2 . Since f is assumed to be bounded, by the dominated convergence
theorem and condition (5), it follows that
Ew;m

e 


  f (w;m) ; (3.7)
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for all  2 . Further, by condition (4), there exists an admissible strategy  :
D ! R such that the equality holds in (7.47). In other words, we deduce that
f (w;m) =  (w;m) = inf
2
Ew;m

e 



= Ew;m[e 

 ];
which completes the proof.
Let f be the function satisfying all the conditions of Theorem 3.2.1. It is not
di¢ cult to see that f (cw; cm) = f (w;m) for any constant c > 0. This scaling
relation implies that we can reduce the dimension of f by considering
f (w;m) = f
w
m
; 1

:= g
w
m

; 1    w
m
 1; (3.8)
where the ratio w=m is the relative fund level. Using the change of variable formulas
fw =
1
m
g0, fww = 1m2 g
00, and fm =   wm2 g0, we immediately obtain the following
corollary from Theorem 3.2.1.
Corollary 3.2.1 Suppose that g : [1   ; 1] ! (0; 1] satises the following condi-
tions:
(1) g() 2 C2([1  ; 1]) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex;
(2) Lg(z)  0 for any  2 R and z 2 [1  ; 1];
(3) There exists an admissible strategy  : [1 ; 1]! R such that Lg(z) = 0
for z 2 [1  ; 1];
(4) g(1  ) = 1;
(5) g0(1) = 0.
Then g(z) = (z) := inf2 Ew;m

e 



for z = w
m
2 [1   ; 1], and  is the
corresponding optimal trading strategy.
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3.2.2 MLDP and optimal trading strategy
In this section, we aim to solve for the MLDP () and the corresponding optimal
trading strategy . By conditions (2) and (3) of Corollary 3.2.1, we have
inf
2R
Lg(z)	 = 0; z 2 [1  ; 1]: (3.9)
By the rst-order condition of Equation (3.9), the minimizer is given in the feedback
form
 (z) =
22   12
21 + 
2
2   212
  (1   2)g
0(z)
(21 + 
2
2   212)zg00(z)
; z 2 [1  ; 1]: (3.10)
Substituting (3.10) into (3.9) followed by algebraic manipulations, we obtain the
nonlinear equation
A
2
z2g00   B
2
(g0)2
g00
  Czg0   g = 0; z 2 [1  ; 1]; (3.11)
whereA := 
2
1
2
2(1 2)
21+
2
2 212 > 0, B :=
(2 1)2
21+
2
2 212  0, and C :=
(2 1)(22 12)
21+
2
2 212  2.
Theorem 3.2.2 Under market model I, the MLDP and its corresponding optimal
trading strategy are respectively given by
(z) = exp
 
 A
Z h 1(1 )
h 1(z)
x
k(x)
dx
!
; (3.12)
and
 (z) =
22   12
21 + 
2
2   212
  1   2
21 + 
2
2   212
Ah 1(z)
A(h 1(z))2 + k(h 1(z))  Ah 1(z) ;
(3.13)
for z 2 [1   ; 1], where k(x) :=  + (A + C)x   Ax2 + p(+ Cx)2 + ABx2
and h(v) := exp

  R 0
v
A
k(x)
dx

for v 2 (v; 0] with v := sup fx < 0 : k(x) = 0g.
Furthermore, ();  () 2 C1([1  ; 1]).
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Proof. In light of Equation (3.11) and Corollary 3.2.1, we consider the following
non-linear equation8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
A
2
z2G00   B
2
(G0)2
G00   CzG0   G = 0; z 2 (0; 1];
G(1) = 1;
G0(1) = 0;
G00(z) > 0; z 2 (0; 1]:
(3.14)
Next, we show that (3.14) admits a unique solution G and furthermore, G 2
C1((0; 1]). The advantage to consider the function G is that it is independent
of .
Dene two auxiliary functions
u(z) :=
zG0(z)
z2G00(z)
and v(z) :=
zG0(z)
G(z)
, z 2 (0; 1]: (3.15)
Since G0(1) = 0 and G00 (z) > 0 for z 2 (0; 1) ; we have G0(z) < 0 for z 2 (0; 1),
which further implies that both u (z) and v (z) are strictly negative functions on
(0; 1). Dividing both sides of the rst equation of (3.14) by zG0(z), we obtain
A
2u
  B
2
u  C   
v
= 0; z 2 (0; 1): (3.16)
Solving the algebraic equation (3.16) with u (z) < 0 and v (z) < 0, we have
1
u
=
+ Cv +
p
(+ Cv)2 + ABv2
Av
: (3.17)
Di¤erentiating v in z from the second relation of (3.15) and subsequently using
(3.17), it follows that
zv0 = z
(zG00 +G0)G  z(G0)2
G2
=
v
u
+ v   v2 = 1
A
k(v); (3.18)
where k(x) :=  + (A + C)x   Ax2 + p(+ Cx)2 + ABx2 for x 2 R. Since
k() 2 C1(R), k(0) = 2 > 0 and limv# 1 k(v) =  1, there exists some point v
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such that
v := sup fx < 0 : k(x) = 0g >  1:
Furthermore, by v0(z)z0(v) = 1, Equation (3.18) becomes
z0(v) =
A
k(v)
z(v);
which admits a unique solution
z(v) = h(v) := exp

 
Z 0
v
A
k(x)
dx

; v 2 (v; 0]; (3.19)
under the boundary condition z(0) = 1. Moreover, by v = h 1(z), it can be
shown that v0(z) > 0 for z 2 (0; 1], v(1) = 0, and limz#0 v(z) = v. Now, letting
H(v) := G(h(v)) = G(z), it follows that8<: dHdv = dGdz dzdv =
vG(z)
z
Az
k(v)
= Av
k(v)
H(v); v 2 (v; 0];
H(0) = 1:
(3.20)
The solution to (3.20) is given by
H(v) = exp

 A
Z 0
v
x
k(x)
dx

; v 2 (v; 0];
or equivalently, we have shown that (3.14) admits a unique solution
G(z) = exp

 A
Z 0
h 1(z)
x
k(x)
dx

2 C1((0; 1]):
Letting
g(z) :=
G(z)
G(1  ) = exp
 
 A
Z h 1(1 )
h 1(z)
x
k(x)
dx
!
; z 2 [1  ; 1]; (3.21)
it is straightforward to verify that g() satises all the conditions of Corollary 3.2.1.
Hence, we conclude that g(z) = (z) for z 2 [1 ; 1] which proves (3.12). Finally,
di¤erentiating (3.21) yields
g0 (z) = g (z)
h 1 (z)
z
and g00 (z) = g(z)
A(h 1(z))2 + k(h 1(z))  Ah 1(z)
Az2
: (3.22)
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Substituting (3.22) into (3.10) leads to the optimal strategy  () 2 C1([1 ; 1])
given in (3.13).  () is bounded in [1  ; 1] since it is countinuous in [1  ; 1]
and [1  ; 1] is a compact set. Thus,  2 . This completes the proof.
We have some interesting observations to make of the MLDP strategy (3.13),
which relate to the classical MV strategy.
1. Suppose that 1 = 2, the optimal strategy (3.13) reduces to a constant
proportional strategy
^ =
22   12
21 + 
2
2   212
: (3.23)
It is easy to see from (3.4) that
min
2
Var [logW t ]
= min
2
Z t
0
 
2s
2
1 + (1  s)2 22 + 2s(1  s)12

ds = Var

logW ^t

:
Hence, when 1 = 2, the MLDP strategy (3.13) coincides with the MV
strategy (3.23).
2. Even if 1 6= 2, we can see from (3.10) and condition (5) of Corollary 3.2.1
that
 (1) =
22   12
21 + 
2
2   212
= ^: (3.24)
Relation (3.24) implies that, when the fund value is at its running maximum,
the MLDP strategy is identical to the MV strategy.
3. By (3.4), we denote by  := 1t+2 (1  t) the instantaneous return rate
of the portfolio at time t under strategy . By (3.10) and the fact that the
MLDP  is decreasing and convex, we have

   ^ = (2   1)(^   (z)) =
 (2   1)20(z)
(21 + 
2
2   212)z00(z)
 0; (3.25)
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for all z 2 [1   ; 1]. In other words, the instantaneous return rate of the
MLDP portfolio is never less than the return rate of the MV portfolio. This
result supports the practical use of drawdown-based performance measures in
which the role of volatility is replaced by drawdown. Intuitively speaking, this
conclusion is consistent with the fact that volatility-based measures penalize
for both upside and downside movements of the fund process while drawdown-
based measures only penalize for downside movements.
This leads to a natural question: How does the MLDP strategy behave when the
fund value is away from a historic high-water mark? We nd that, as shown in
the next proposition, it is optimal to increase the proportion invested in the asset
with a higher instantaneous rate of return as the portfolios relative drawdown level
increases (even though this may increase the portfolios variance).
Proposition 3.2.1 Suppose that 1 6= 2. We have
(1   2)
d
dz
< 0; z 2 [1  ; 1]:
Proof. By (3.10) and the denitions of u() and v() in (3.15), it follows that the
optimal strategy can be rewritten as
 (z) =
22   12
21 + 
2
2   212
+
2   1
21 + 
2
2   212
u(z);
which implies that
(1   2)
d
dz
=   (2   1)
2
21 + 
2
2   212
du
dz
:
By (3.18), we have
dv
dz
=
1
Az
k(v) > 0: (3.26)
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On the other hand, solving v from (3.16), we obtain v = 2u
A Bu2 2Cu which yields
dv
du
=
2A+ 2Bu2
(A Bu2   2Cu)2 > 0: (3.27)
Using (3.26), (3.27), and dv
dz
= dv
du
du
dz
, we conclude that du
dz
> 0. This ends the
proof.
Remark 3.2.1 As for the market model II of Section 3.3, a proportional manage-
ment fee of the fund with rate  2 (0; 1) can easily be incorporated into the above
analysis. Then the dynamics of the fund value process (3.4) becomes
dW t = (t1 + (1  t)2   )W t dt+ tW t 1dB(1)t + (1  t)W t 2dB(2)t :
It is clear that the formulas of the MLDP (3.12) and the optimal trading strategy
(3.13) still hold by simply replacing 1 and 2 by 1    and 2   , respectively.
3.2.3 Numerical examples
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the main results
of Section 2. We consider a relative drawdown level of  = 0:2 and an investors
expected future lifetime of 20 years (i.e.  = 0:05).
In Figure 1, we set 1 = 0:1; 2 = 0:15; 1 = 0:125; 2 = 0:15 and  = 0:2:
We rst examine the diversication benet by comparing in Figure 1 (left plot)
the MLDP to the drawdown probability for investment in Asset 1 or 2 only. The
drawdown probabilities for geometric Brownian motions were rst derived by Taylor
[86] and can also be found more recently in, e.g., Theorem 1 of Avram et. al. [11].
We recall this result here. For S := fStgt0 a geometric Brownian motion with
dynamics
dSt = Stdt+ StdBt; S0 := w > 0,
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where  2 R,  > 0, and fBtgt0 is a standard Brownian motion, we dene the rst
time the relative drawdown of S exceeds level  as  := inf ft  0 :Mt   St > Mtg,
where Mt := max

sup0ut Su;m
	
and m  w. Then,
Pzf < eg := Pw;mf < eg = 
+z
     z+
+ (1  )      (1  )+
;
where z := w
m
2 [1  ; 1] and  =  +2=2
p
( 2=2)2+22
2
.
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Figure 3.1. Lifetime drawdown probabilities (left) and the MLDP trading strategy
(right)
We observe that the drawdown probabilities are considerably lower under the
MLDP strategy (than investing in either Asset 1 or 2). In Figure 3.1 (right plot),
we provide the curve of the corresponding MLDP strategy as a function of the
relative fund level z = w=m. Notice that  is increasing in z, which is consistent
with Proposition 3.2.1 as 1 = 0:1 < 0:15 = 2.
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Figure 3.2. Impact of  on the MLDP (left) and the MLDP trading strategy
(right)
Next, we are interested in studying the impact of the correlation coe¢ cient  of
the two risky assets on the MLDP and the corresponding optimal trading strategy.
We set 1 = 0:05; 2 = 0:3; 1 = 0:2 and 2 = 0:36 to produce the numerical
values of Figure 3.2. We nd that neither of these two quantities is necessarily
monotone in . In the left plot, we observe that the MLDPs are rst increasing and
then decreasing in  for any z 2 [1   ; 1]. This shows that a selection of highly
correlated assets ( close to  1 or 1 in this example) in a portfolio can help reduce
the MLDP of the portfolio. In the right plot, we can see that the impact of  on
the optimal strategy (z) is even more complex. However, when z = 1, we nd
that (1) is increasing in . This observation can easily be veried from (3.24) as
(2   1)@
(1)
@
=
12(2   1)2(2 + 1)
(21 + 
2
2   212)2
 0:
Note that we choose 2 = 0:36 > 0:2 = 1.
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3.3 Market model II
In this section, we examine the second market model consisting of a risk-free as-
set with constant interest rate r > 0 and a risky asset governed by a geometric
Brownian motion with dynamics
dSt = Stdt+ StdBt; S0 > 0;
where  2 R,  > 0, and fBtgt0 is a standard Brownian motion dened on
(
;F ;F ;P). To avoid triviality, a proportional management fee with rate r <  < 1
is continuously deducted from the fund. Therefore, for an admissible strategy  2 
representing the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, the dynamics of the
fund value process W  is then given by
dW t = tW

t
dSt
St
+ (1  t)rW t dt  W t dt
= (t(  r) + r   )W t dt+ tW t dBt; (3.28)
with initial value W0 = w > 0.
At rst glance, one may view market model II as a limiting case of market model
I by letting 2 ! 0 and 2 = r. However, as will be shown, the treatment of these
two models and the associated HJB equations are structurally di¤erent. First, it is
not obvious to nd the limit of the MLDP (3.12) and the optimal strategy (3.13)
by letting 2 ! 0 given that the form of h 1 is not fully explicit. Also, even if an
explicit limit exists, the continuity of the MLDP and the optimal strategy w.r.t.
2 at 0+ needs to be justied. Second, a major di¤erence in the analysis of market
model II is that we shall rst narrow down the candidate pool of the optimal trading
strategy. Interestingly, this intuition is based on some observations we made under
market model I.
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3.3.1 Verication theorem
We dene a di¤erential operator ~L ( 2 R) as
~Lf = ((  r) + r   )xfx + 1
2
22x2fxx   f;
where f is a twice-di¤erentiable function in x. Then we decompose the admissible
set of trading strategies  as
 = 0 [ 1;
where 0 = f 2  : t = 0 a.s. on (Mt = W t )g and 1 = n0. Therefore, 0
is the set of admissible strategies which has no risky investment whenever the
associated fund value is at its running maximum. For any  2 0, due to the
absence of di¤usion component when the fund value process reaches its running
maximum and the negative drift r    of the value process at that moment, a new
running maximum of the associated value process W  will never occur, i.e.,
dMt = 0 a.s. for any  2 0 and t > 0. (3.29)
A verication theorem for the MLDP and the optimal trading strategy of market
model II is given below.
Theorem 3.3.1 Suppose that f : D ! (0; 1] satises the following conditions:
(1) For any xed m > 0, f(;m) 2 C2([m (1  ) ;m]) is strictly decreasing and
strictly convex;
(2) For any xed w > 0, f(w; ) 2 C1 ([w;w= (1  )]) is strictly increasing;
(3) For any xed m > 0 and  2 R, Lf(;m)  0 for w 2 [m (1  ) ;m];
(4) For any xed m > 0, there exists an admissible strategy  : D ! R such
that  2 0 and Lf(;m) = 0 for w 2 [m (1  ) ;m];
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(5) For any m > 0, f(m (1  ) ;m) = 1;
Then f(w;m) =  (w;m) on D, where  (w;m) is the MLDP dened in (3.3),
and  is the corresponding optimal trading strategy.
Proof. Suppose that f : D ! (0; 1] satises conditions (1)-(5) of Theorem 3.3.1
and  2 0 is an admissible strategy satisfying condition (4). By condition (2) and
the fact that Mt is a non-decreasing process, we know that fm(W

t ;M

t )dM

t  0
a.s.. Along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, one can see that (7.2)
still holds for all  2 . Moreover, by  2 0 and (3.29), the equality holds in
(7.2) for . Using the same arguments as the rest of the proof of Theorem 3.2.1,
we complete the proof of Theorem 3.3.1.
Similar as (3.8), the dimension of f in Theorem 3.3.1 can be reduced by con-
sidering
f (w;m) = f
w
m
; 1

:= g
w
m

; 1    w
m
 1;
which immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3.1 Suppose that g : [1   ; 1] ! (0; 1] satises the following condi-
tions:
(1) g() 2 C2([1  ; 1]) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex;
(2) ~Lg(z)  0 for any  2 R and z 2 [1  ; 1];
(3) There exists an admissible strategy  : [1   ; 1] ! R such that  2 0
and ~Lg(z) = 0 for z 2 [1  ; 1];
(4) g(1  ) = 1;
(5) limz"1 g00(1) =1 if  6= r.
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Then g(z) = (z) := inf2 Ew;m

e 



for z = w
m
2 [1   ; 1], and  is the
corresponding optimal trading strategy.
In comparison to Corollary 3.2.1, the presence of the two new conditions  2 0
and limz"1 g00(z) = 1 if  6= r may appear abrupt. However, both conditions are
in agreement with conclusions reached under market model I. First, the condition
 2 0 is consistent with the conclusion that the MLDP strategy is identical to
the MV strategy when the portfolio value is at its running maximum. On the other
hand, one can argue  =2 1. Otherwise, by (3.29), we should have PfMt > m for
some t > 0g > 0, which further implies that g0(1) = 0 from the proof of Theorem
3.2.2. Moreover, by the rst-order condition, we have
(z) =
8<:  
 r
2
g0(z)
zg00(z) ; if  6= r;
0; if  = r:
(3.30)
Substituting (3.30) into the equation ~Lg(z) = 0, we obtain the nonlinear equation
(  r)2
22
(g0)2
g00
+ (   r)zg0 + g = 0; z 2 [1  ; 1]: (3.31)
However, by the conditions of Corollary 3.3.1, we have
(  r)2
22
(g0(1))2
g00(1)
+ (   r)zg0(1) + g(1)  g(1) > 0,
which contradicts (3.31). Therefore, we deduce  2 0 and g0(1) 6= 0; which
further implies that limz"1 g00(z) =1 if  6= r by (3.30).
Remark 3.3.1 Under market model II, we have  2 0, which implies that the
fund value process will never reach a new running maximum by (3.29). Intuitively
speaking, this conclusion is consistent with the fact that the objective function of the
MLDP problem (3.3) only penalizes downside risk and does not o¤er incentives to
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reach a new running maximum. As shown in Proposition 3.3.1 and Figure 3.3 later,
the MLDP strategy becomes more conservative as the fund value increases. As such,
since  > r, when the fund value recovers its running maximum, it is preferable to
invest all in the risk-free asset (even if the instantaneous return rate of the portfolio
is negative) rather than "gamble" by investing a nonzero proportion of the portfolio
in the risky asset and increase the exposure to substantial drawdowns.
3.3.2 MLDP and optimal trading strategy
By (3.31) and Corollary 3.3.1, we only need to nd a positive, strictly decreasing,
strictly convex, and C2([1  ; 1]) solution to the following nonlinear equation8>>><>>>:
( r)2
22
(g0)2
g00 + (   r)zg0 + g = 0; z 2 [1  ; 1];
g(1  ) = 1;
limz"1 g00(z) =1, if  6= r:
(3.32)
Theorem 3.3.2 Under market model II, the MLDP and its corresponding optimal
trading strategy are respectively given by
(z) =
8<: exp

  R ~h 1(1 )~h 1(z) x~k(x)dx ; if  6= r; 
1 
z
=( r)
; if  = r;
(3.33)
and
 (z) =
8<:
2
 r

   r + ~h 1(z)

; if  6= r;
0; if  = r;
(3.34)
for z 2 [1  ; 1], where
~k(x) :=  (  r)
2
22
x2
(   r)x+  + x  x
2 and ~h(v) := exp
 
 
Z  =( r)
v
1
~k(x)
dx
!
;
for v 2 (~v; =(   r)] with ~v =
 r   ( r)2
22
 
r
 r   ( r)2
22
2
+4( r)
2( r) . Further-
more, ();  () 2 C1([1  ; 1]).
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Proof. For the simple case  = r, the solution to (3.32) is easily found to
be g(z) =
 
1 
z
=( r)
for z 2 [1   ; 1]. By Corollary 3.3.1, one concludes that
g() = ().
For the case  6= r, similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2.2, we consider the
following equation:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
( r)2
22
(G0)2
G00 + (   r)zG0 + G = 0; z 2 (0; 1];
G(1) = 1;
limz"1G00(z) =1;
G0(z) < 0; z 2 (0; 1]:
G00(z) > 0; z 2 (0; 1]:
(3.35)
We show that (3.35) admits a unique solution with G 2 C1((0; 1]). First, substi-
tuting the auxiliary functions u () and v () dened in (3.15) into the rst equation
of (3.35) yields ( r)
2
22
u =  
v
  (   r). This together with (3.18) leads to
zv0 =
v
u
+ v   v2 =  (  r)
2
22
v2
(   r)v +  + v   v
2 := ~k(v): (3.36)
Note that ~k(v) 2 C1(( 1; =( r))) with limv" =( r) ~k(v) =1 and limv# 1 ~k(v) =
 1. Hence, we denote by
~v := sup
n
x <  =(   r) : ~k(x) = 0
o
=
   r     ( r)2
22
 
r
   r     ( r)2
22
2
+ 4(   r)
2(   r) :
By (3.35), it is easy to see that v(1) = G0(1) =  =(   r). Moreover, by (3.36)
and using the relation z0(v)v0(z) = 1, we obtain
z(v) = ~h(v) := exp
 
 
Z  =( r)
v
1
~k(x)
dx
!
, v 2 (~v; =(   r)]: (3.37)
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Now, by (3.37), let H(v) := G(~h(v)) = G(z). It follows from the second relation of
(3.15) and (3.36) that H(v) is the solution to the following equation8<:
dH
dv
= dG
dz
dz
dv
= vG(z)
z
z
~k(v)
= v~k(v)H(v); v 2 (v; =(   r)];
H( =(   r)) = G(1) = 1:
Solving the above initial value problem, we have
G(z) = exp
 
 
Z  =( r)
v(z)
x
~k(x)
dx
!
= exp
 
 
Z  =( r)
~h 1(z)
x
~k(x)
dx
!
2 C1((0; 1]):
Finally, letting
g(z) :=
G(z)
G(1  ) = exp
 
 
Z ~h 1(1 )
~h 1(z)
x
~k(x)
dx
!
; z 2 [1  ; 1]; (3.38)
it is straightforward to verify that g() satises all the conditions of Corollary 3.3.1,
which ends the proof of (3.33). By di¤erentiating (3.38) and further using (3.30),
we obtain the optimal strategy  given in (3.34).  is bounded in [1  ; 1]
since it is continuous in [1  ; 1] and [1  ; 1] is a compact set. Moreover, it is
straightforward to see that (1) = 0: Thus,  2 0: This completes the proof.
The proof of the following proposition is similar to Proposition 3.2.1, and hence
is omitted.
Proposition 3.3.1 Under market model II, for  6= r, we have
(  r)d

dz
< 0; z 2 [1  ; 1]:
By Theorem 3.3.2 and Proposition 3.3.1, the following implications of market
model I also hold under market model II:
1. At high-water mark (i.e.  2 0 or equivalently (1) = 0), the MLDP
strategy (3.34) is consistent with the MV strategy.
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2. When the drawdown level increases, the MLDP strategy tends to increase the
proportion invested in the asset with a higher return rate.
3. Similarly as in (3.25), it is easy to verify that the instantaneous return rate
of the MLDP portfolio is never less than the return rate of the MV portfolio.
3.3.3 Numerical examples
We numerically implement the main results of Section 3 by rst conducting a sen-
sitivity analysis on the management fee rate . For this purpose, we let  = 0:2;
 = 0:05;  = 0:12;  = 0:12 and r = 0:05. The numerical values of the MLDPs
and the corresponding optimal trading strategies can be found in Figure 3.3 for
various  values.
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Figure 3.3. Impact of  on the MLDP (left) and the MLDP trading strategy
(right)
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For a xed , one can see that the MLDP satises all the conditions of Corollary
3.3.1. In particular, we see that 0(1) < 0, which is di¤erent from market model
I (condition 5 of Corollary 3.2.1). For the optimal trading strategy, as  > r; we
nd  is decreasing in z which is consistent with Proposition 3.3.1. Moreover,
we see that  (1) = 0 which satises condition (3) of Corollary 3.3.1. As for
the impact of , not surprisingly, we nd that both the MLDP and the optimal
trading strategy are increasing in , i.e., a high management fee will incur a higher
drawdown probability and result in a more aggressive investment strategy.
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Figure 3.4. The MLDP and MLRP trading strategies
In Figure 3.4, we are interested in comparing the MLDP strategy with the
MLRP strategy  of Young [88]. We recall that the MLRP strategy is a constant
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proportional strategy given by
 =
  r
2(1  ~v) :
In Figure 3.4, we use the same parameter setting as in Figure 3.3 except we choose
 = 0:07, the oored maximum m = 100, and the ruin level wr = 80. We see that
the MLDP strategy is always more conservative than the MLRP strategy. In fact,
with some calculations, one can verify from (3.34) and Proposition 3.3.1 that
 (z) < lim
z#0
 (z) =
2
  r

   r + 
~v

= ; 0 < z  1:
This relation is also proved in Theorem 3.2 of Angoshtari et al. [5]. Intuitively, this
is because, for any admissible strategy, the rst drawdown time of the associated
wealth process always occurs before (or equal to) the ruin time. To prevent the oc-
currence of an earlier stopping time, an investor tends to adopt a more conservative
strategy.
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Chapter 4
Maximizing a Fund Managers
Income under Drawdown-based
Penalties
4.1 Introduction
Fund managers implement investment strategies for investors and receive income
(usually in the form of nancial compensation) for providing the professional nan-
cial service. In most contracts, the fund managers income structure is designed to
be performance dependent and consistent with the main objectives of the fund un-
der management (and hence, its investorsrisk prole). This income structure varies
quite signicantly among investment products and can sometimes be customized
for large investors. Subject to a given income structure, a natural question arises:
what (trading) strategy should a fund manager adopt to maximize his/her expected
cumulative income over the investment period? In this chapter, we propose to make
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use of the concept of drawdown to design a managers income structure, and pro-
vide an answer to the above question. Indeed, drawdown is a natural risk metric
to use in the design of a managers income structure for similar reasons discussed
in the introduction of the thesis. We are thus motivated to develop a dynamic
drawdown-based income structure for a fund manager, and study the managers
optimal trading strategy under a cumulative income maximization objective.
We consider a nancial market model consisting of a risk-free asset with constant
interest rate r > 0 and a risky asset governed by a geometric Brownian motion with
dynamics
dSt = Stdt+ StdBt; S0 > 0;
where  2 R > r,  > 0, and fBtgt0 is a standard Brownian motion dened
on a ltered complete probability space (
;F ;F = fFtgt0 ;P) satisfying usual
conditions. A proportional consumption at rate  2 (r; 1) is continuously deducted
from the fund by the investor. We denote by  = ftgt0 an F -progressively
measurable trading strategy, where t represents the fraction of fund invested in
the risky asset at time t. The associated fund value process is denoted by W  =
fW t gt0 ; whose dynamics is given by
dW t = (1  t)W t rdt+ tW t
dSt
St
  W t dt
= (r    + (  r)t)W t dt+ tW t dBt; (4.1)
with initial value W0 = w > 0. We assumed that 0 is an absorbing state, i.e.,
W t = 0; 8t  inf fs : Ws  0g : We dene the (oored) running maximum of the
fund value at time t by
Mt = max

sup
0st
W s ;m

with m  w. The ratios (Mt  W t ) =Mt and W t =Mt are respectively called the
relative drawdown level and the relative fund level at time t:
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The main objective of this chapter is to study the problem of maximizing a
fund managers cumulative income under drawdown based penalty schemes over a
lifetime investment, i.e.,
v (w;m) = sup
2
Ew;m
Z e^
0

s0   

Mt  W t
Mt

dt

; (4.2)
where s0 is the ceiling rate at which the fund manager is paid;  : [0; 1)! R is an
increasing function representing the penalty on the relative drawdown level;
 = inf

t  0 : M

t  W t
Mt
> 

is the rst time the funds relative drawdown level exceeds  2 (0; 1]; e represents
a random investment maturity (which can be triggered by exogenous factors, e.g.,
death) which is assumed to be an F-measurable exponentially distributed random
variable with mean 1= > 0, independent of the fund value process;  is the set of
admissible trading strategies dened as
 =

 :  is F -progressively measurable and
Z t
0
2sds <1 for any t  0

:
(4.3)
In particular, when  = 1, since W t > 0 for any t  0, by (4.1) and (4.3), we have
 = inff;g =1 by convention.
Objective (4.2) generalizes two problems in the literature. First, by choosing
 ()  0, objective (4.2) is equivalent to minimizing the lifetime drawdown proba-
bility (MLDP), namely
inf
2
Pw;m ( < e) ;
which was studied by Angoshtari et al. [4] and Chen et al. [39]. Second, by choosing
 () = 1fg for some constant  2 (0; 1), and letting  = 1 (or equivalently
 = 1); objective (4.2) reduces to minimizing the cumulative time the funds
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relative drawdown level exceeds , namely
inf
2
Ew;m
Z e
0
1nMt  Wt
Mt

odt

;
which was studied by Angoshtari et al. [5].
Since problem (4.2) does not admit a closed-form solution for a general penalty
function , we focus on the following two problems with specic drawdown penalty
schemes:
v1 (w;m) = sup
2
Ew;m
Z e^
0

s0   s11nMt  Wt
Mt

o dt ; 0 <  <  < 1; (4.4)
and
v2 (w;m) = sup
2
Ew;m
Z e
0

s0   s1

Mt  W t
Mt
  

+

dt

; 0 <  < 1; (4.5)
where s1 2 (0; s0) is the penalty rate and (x)+ = max fx; 0g :
For objective (4.4), referred as the constant penalty scheme, the manager re-
ceives an income rate of s0 whenever the relative drawdown level is less than .
When the funds drawdown level exceeds  (but is less than ), the managers
income rate is reduced to s0  s1. If the funds drawdown level ever reaches level 
before the random maturity e, the managers operation of the fund stops (together
with the income rate). For objective (4.5), referred as the linear penalty scheme,
the managers income rate is still s0 whenever the relative drawdown level is below
. When the drawdown level exceeds , the penalty is linearly proportional to
the excess drawdown level over , and hence the manager receives income at rate
s0   s1

Mt  Wt
Mt
  

. The fund operation is only terminated at the random ma-
turity e. Roughly speaking, the constant penalty scheme penalizes the maximum
drawdown, which is in the spirit of Calmar ratio, and the linear penalty scheme
penalizes the average drawdown which is in the spirit of Sterling ratio.
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The main implications of this chapter are summarized as follows. First, under
both penalty schemes, the MCI strategy in the non-penalty region coincides with
the minimum lifetime drawdown probability (MLDP) strategy derived in Chen
et al. [39] under market model II, i.e., the only objective of the manager is to
minimize the probability of triggering a penalty, independent of the magnitude of
the income penalty rate. Second, under the constant penalty scheme, the MCI
strategy in the penalty region could exhibit di¤erent behaviors as the fund level
increases depending on which of the following two e¤ects prevails: maintaining the
fund risk at an acceptable level by investing conservatively to avoid large drawdowns
and leaving the penalty region by investing more aggressively. Third, under the
linear penalty scheme without the terminating drawdown level, we nd that the
manager always becomes more conservative as the fund level increases, as the e¤ect
of higher drawdown penalties dominates.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide a
verication theorem for the general drawdown-based penalty schemes. Sections
4.3 and 4.4 consider the two specic penalty schemes detailed above (the constant
penalty scheme and linear penalty scheme, respectively) in great length. By ap-
plying a dual approach, we obtain closed-form expressions for the MCI and the
MCI strategy in both cases. Numerical examples are provided at the end of each
section to complement the analytic results. Some technical proofs are deferred to
the Appendix.
4.2 Verication Theorem
We dene a region
D =

(w;m) 2 R2 : m  w  m and m > 0	 ;
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and subsequently a di¤erential operator L ( 2 R) as
Lf (w;m) = [r    + (  r)]wfw + 1
2
22w2fww   f + s0   

m  w
m

;
where f is a twice-di¤erentiable function in w with fw :=
@f
@w
and fww :=
@2f
@w2
.
We rst give a verication theorem for the general objective (4.2). The proof of
the verication theorem is postponed to the Appendix.
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose that f : D ! R is bounded and satises the following
conditions:
(1) 8m > 0, f(;m) 2 C2[(1  )m;m] (f (;m) 2 C1 at (nitely many) points
where  (1  =m) is discontinuous) is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(2) 8w > 0, f(w; ) 2 C1[w;1) is strictly decreasing;
(3) 8m > 0 and  2 R, Lf(;m)  0 for w 2 [(1  )m;m];
(4) 8m > 0, there exists an admissible strategy
 := argmax
2R
fLf(;m)g
such that Lf(;m) = 0, 8w 2 [(1  )m;m];
(5) f (m (1  ) ;m) = 0 if  2 (0; 1) ; f (0;m) = s0 (1)

if  = 1;
(6) limw!m  fww (w;m) =  1;
Then f = v on D; where v is the value function of objective (4.2), and  is the
corresponding optimal trading strategy.
Let f be the function satisfying all the conditions of Theorem 4.2.1. It is not
di¢ cult to see that f (cw; cm) = f (w;m) for any constant c > 0. This scaling
relationship implies that we can reduce the dimension of f by considering
f (w;m) = f
w
m
; 1

:= g
w
m

= g(z); 1    z := w
m
 1;
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where the ratio w=m is the relative fund level. Using the change of variable formulas
fw =
1
m
gz, fww = 1m2 gzz, and fm =   wm2 gz, the following corollary is a natural
consequence of Theorem 4.2.1.
Corollary 4.2.1 Suppose that g : [1   ; 1] ! R is bounded and satises the
following conditions:
(1) g() 2 C2[1   ; 1] (g () 2 C1 at points where  (1  ) is discontinuous) is
strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(2) g () is a solution to8>>><>>>:
(r   ) zgz (z)   g2z(z)gzz(z)   g (z) + s0    (1  z) = 0; z 2 (1  ; 1);
limz"1 gzz (z) =  1;
g (1  ) = 0; if  2 (0; 1) ; g (0) = s0 (1)

if  = 1;
where  = 1
2
 
 r

2
: Then g (z) = v (z) := sup2 Ew;m[
R e^
0
(s0   (M

t  Wt
Mt
))dt]
and the optimal trading strategy is given by
 (z) =    r
2
gz(z)
zgzz(z)
;
for z = w
m
2 [1  ; 1].
4.3 Constant Penalty Scheme
This section is devoted to the analysis of objective (4.4) under the constant penalty
scheme. By Corollary 4.2.1 with  (x) = s11fxg, the associated HJB equation is
given by8<: (r   ) zgz (z)  
g2z(z)
gzz(z)
  g (z) + s0   s11f1 zg = 0; z 2 (1  ; 1);
limz"1 gzz (z) =  1; g (1  ) = 0:
(4.6)
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4.3.1 MCI and Optimal Strategy
Rather than directly solving (4.6), we rst consider the following free boundary
problem (FBP):8<: y2 ^yy +
+ r

y ^y     ^ + s0   s1 1fyyg = 0; 0 < y0 < y < y <1;
 ^y (y0) =  1;  ^yy (y0) = 0;  ^y (y) =    1;  ^y (y) =   1;  ^ (y) = (  1) y:
(4.7)
The solution to the FBP (4.7) is given in Lemma 4.3.1 below. The proof can be
found in the Appendix. The main di¢ culty lies in proving the uniqueness of the
solution to equation (4.12) and the convexity of  ^.
Lemma 4.3.1 For y 2 [y0; y] ; the solution to the FBP (4.7) is given by
 ^ (y) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1 +)y0
(+  ) 

y
y0
 
+
(1  )y0
(  +)+

y
y0
+
+ s0

; y 2 [y0; y];
( 1)y(+ 1)
(+  )   (s0 s1)
+
(+  )

y
y
 
+

( 1)y(  1)
(  +)   (s0 s1)
 
(  +)

y
y
+
+ s0 s1

; y 2 (y; y];
(4.8)
where 8<:   =
(r+  ) 
p
(+ r )2+4
2
< 0;
+ =
(r+  )+
p
(+ r )2+4
2
2 (0; 1) :
(4.9)
The boundaries y, y0 and y are respectively given by
y =
(s0   s1) + 


 
   +

(  1)(+   1)   1   (  1)(    1)++ 1   (   1)(+    )
;
(4.10)
y0 = y=0 and y = y=, where 0 is the unique solution in (1;1) to
1  +
+    x
  1 +
1   
    +x
+ 1 =    1; (4.11)
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and  is the unique solution in (0; 1) to
(  1) [(+   1)  x  1   (    1) +x+ 1]  (   1) (+    )
(s0   s1) +  (x    x+)
=
(  1) [(+   1)x  1   (    1)x+ 1] 

1 +
  
  1
0   1 
 
+

+ 1
0

s1 (+    ) + (s0   s1) (+x     x+) :
(4.12)
Furthermore,  ^ is strictly convex, strictly decreasing, and C2 in [y0; y] except at
y = y; where it is C1:
Lemma 4.3.2 For  ^ dened in (4.8), consider its Legendre transform dened as
 (z) = inf
y2[y0;y]
n
 ^ (y) + yz
o
; z 2 [1  ; 1] : (4.13)
Then  (z) solves (4.6) and
 (z) = v1 (z) := sup
2
Ew;m
Z e^
0

s0   s11n
<
Mt  Wt
Mt

o dt ;
for z = w
m
2 [1  ; 1] : Furthermore,  is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and
C2 in [1  ; 1] except at z = 1  ; where it is C1.
Proof. Lemma 4.3.1 shows that  ^ is strictly convex, strictly decreasing, and C2
in [y0; y] except at y = y; where it is C1. The property of Legendre transform
immediately implies that  is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and C2 except
at z = 1   ; where it is C1. To show  () = v1 (), by Corollary 4.2.1, it is only
left to verify that  () solves (4.6).
From the boundary conditions in (4.7) and Lemma 4.3.1, we recall that  ^y (y) =
 1 and  ^ is strictly convex on [y0; y]. It implies that  ^ (y)+y (1  ) is decreasing
on [y0; y] and attains its inmum at y = y. Thus
 (1  ) =  ^ (y) + y (1  ) = 0; (4.14)
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and the "dual" of z = 1    is y = y. Similarly, since  ^y (y0) =  1 and  ^ is
strictly convex on [y0; ya] ; we conclude that  ^ (y) + y is increasing on [y0; y] and
attains its inmum at y = y0. Thus, the dual of z = 1 is y = y0:
For z 2 (1  ; 1) ; by the rst-order condition, the optimizer y 2 (y0; y) of
(4.13) solves the equation
 ^y (y) =  z: (4.15)
By Lemma 4.3.1, we deduce y = I1 ( z) ; where I1 := ( ^) 1 is the inverse function
of  ^y: It follows that
 (z) =  ^ (y) + yz =  ^ (I1 ( z)) + I1 ( z) z; z 2 (1  ; 1) : (4.16)
Taking the rst and second order derivatives with respect to z to (4.16) yields
 z (z) = y
 = I1 ( z) and  zz (z) =  
1
 ^yy (y
)
=   1
 ^yy (I1( z))
: (4.17)
Since the dual of z = 1 is y = y0, by the second relation of (4.17), we deduce
lim
z"1
 zz (z) =   lim
y#y0
1
 ^yy (y
)
=  1: (4.18)
Using (4.14)(4.18), it is straightforward to verify that  (z) solves (4.6).
Theorem 4.3.1 For z 2 (1  ; 1];
v1 (z) =
8><>: C
 

I1( z)
y
 
+ C+

I1( z)
y
+
+ s0 s1

  I1 ( z) z; ; z 2 (1  ; 1  );
D 

I1( z)
y0
 
+D+

I1( z)
y0
+
+ s0

  I1 ( z) z ; z 2 [1  ; 1];
and the optimal trading strategy is given by
1 (z) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 r
2zy

C   (    1)

I1( z)
y
  1
+C++ (+   1)

I1( z)
y
+ 1 ; z 2 (1  ; 1  );
 r
2z
(1 +)(  1)
(+  )

I1( z)
y0
  1
 

I1( z)
y0
+ 1
; z 2 [1  ; 1];
(4.19)
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where
C  =

(  1) y (+   1)
(+    )  
(s0   s1) +
 (+    )

;
C+ =

(  1) y (    1)
(    +)  
(s0   s1)  
 (    +)

;
D  =
(1  +) y0
(+    )   ; D
+ =
(1   ) y0
(    +) + ;
I1 = ( ^y)
 1; and the function  ^ and the constants y0; y; y;  are as given in
Lemma 4.3.1.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Corollary 3.2.1, Lemma 4.3.1, and
Lemma 4.3.2. Moreover, 1 is bounded in [1  ; 1  ] and [1  ; 1] given that
it is continous in each interval and each interval is a compact set. Then, it is
straightforward to verify that 1 2 :
Remark 4.3.1 As we see from (4.19), the MCI strategy in the non-penalty region
(i.e., for z 2 [1  ; 1]) is independent of the penalty rate s1. Moreover, one can
verify that the MCI strategy in the non-penalty region coincides with the MLDP
strategy in Theorem 3.2 of Chen et. al. [39]. This implies that, when the funds
relative drawdown level is small, the managers goal is to minimize the probability
that the relative drawdown level reaches level , indi¤erently of the size of the penalty
rate s1.
Next, we study the behavior of the optimal trading strategy 1.
Proposition 4.3.1 For z 2 [1  ; 1] ; 1 (z) is decreasing. For z 2 (1 ; 1  );
1 (z) is decreasing if
(  1)+ 1     1; (4.20)
and increasing otherwise.
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Proof. By the rst relation of (4.17), for y = I1 ( z) 2 (y0; y);
d1
dz
=
d1
dy
dy
dz
=
d1
dy
d2v1
dz2
:
By Lemma 4.3.2, v1 is strictly concave on [1  ; 1] ; which implies d2v1dz2  0: Thus,
it remains to determine the sign of d

1
dy
: For y 2 (y0; y]; i.e., z 2 [1   ; 1); di¤er-
entiating (4.19) and using some algebraic manipulations, we obtain that
d1
dy
/ +     > 0;
where / means the relationship of positive proportional. Similarly for y 2
(y; y) ; i.e., z 2 (1  ; 1  ); we obtain that
d1
dy
/  

(  1)  +   1  (s0   s1) +
y

:
Clearly, d

1
dy
 0 if
s0   s1  (  1) (
+   1)y
+
; (4.21)
and d

1
dy
< 0, otherwise. Finally, replacing y on the right-hand side of (4.21) using
(4.10), followed by some algebraic manipulations of the resulting inequality leads
to (4.20). This completes the proof of Proposition 4.3.1.
4.3.2 Numerical Examples
In this subsection, we provide several numerical examples to the main results of
Section 4.3.1, and study the sensitivity of the MCI strategy to some key model
parameters. Throughout, we assume that r = 0:03;  = 0:1;  = 0:2; and s0 = 1.
Also, the threshold drawdown levels of  = 0:5 (fund termination), and  = 0:2
(income penalty) are considered.
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Example 4.3.1 (MCI and MCI strategy) In this example, by setting  = 0:05;
 = 0:1; and di¤erent levels of s1, we obtain the corresponding MCI (left plot) and
MCI strategies (right plot) in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. MCI (right) and MCI strategy (left)
The left plot shows that the MCI v1 is increasing and concave. In the right plot,
we rst observe that
 in the non-penalty region (i.e., z 2 [0:8; 1]), the MCI strategy is independent
of s1. Indeed, from Remark 4.3.1, we know that the MCI strategy in the
non-penalty region coincides with the MLDP strategy in Chen et al. [39]. As
expected, we remark that the manager invests more conservatively as the fund
level increases;
 in the penalty region (i.e., z 2 [0:5; 0:8]), the MCI strategy can either be
more aggressive or conservative as the fund level increases, depending on the
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penalty rate s1. This can be explained by the dilemma the manager faces
between maintaining the fund risk at an acceptable level by investing conserv-
atively to avoid a drawdown of size  and (possibly) leaving the penalty region
by investing more aggressively. In fact, there exists a critical level s1 = 0:053
such that (4.20) achieves equality. When the managers income is penalized
by s1; the MCI strategy is indi¤erent to changes in fund level. When the
penalty rate s1 > (< resp.) s1; the manager has a strong (weak resp.) in-
centive to leave the penalty region and the investment strategy becomes more
aggressive (conservative resp.) as the fund level increases. These implications
are consistent with Proposition 4.3.1.
In particular, when s1 = 0; the MCI strategy coincides with the MLDP strategy
for any fund level z 2 (1   ; 1]. When s1 > 0, the MCI strategy is always more
aggressive than the MLDP strategy for any fund level z 2 (1   ; 1], as the MCI
strategy o¤ers an incentive to leave the penalty region.
Example 4.3.2 (Impact of ) In this example, by setting  = 0:1 and di¤erent
levels of ; we obtain the MCI strategy in the penalty region with a small penalty
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rate s1 = 0:05 (left plot) and a large penalty rate s1 = 0:2 (right plot) in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Impact of  on MCI strategy in the penalty region
The left plot shows that, when the penalty rate s1 is relatively small (i.e., s1 = 0:05),
the manager adopts a more aggressive strategy over a longer investment time hori-
zon (i.e., for a smaller ). Indeed, given that the managers income penalty is rather
small, the incentive to leave the penalty region (which is accomplished by adopting a
more aggressive trading strategy) increases with the investment time horizon. How-
ever, the right plot shows that, for a large penalty rate s1, a MCI strategy with
a shorter time horizon may become more aggressive (than its counterpart with a
longer time horizon). This is because the magnitude of the income penalty rate s1
creates a strong incentive for the manager to leave the penalty region by investing
more aggressively. For fund levels close to the non-penalty region, this incentive
to leave the penalty region becomes more pressing for an investment with a shorter
time horizon as the manager is also competing against time.
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Example 4.3.3 (Impact of  ) In this example, we study the impact of the con-
sumption rate  on the managers MCI strategy in the penalty region in Figure 4.3
by setting  = 0:05;  = 0:2; and s1 = 0:1.
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Figure 4.3. Impact of  in the penalty region
Not surprisingly, we see that a larger consumption rate  results in a more aggressive
MCI strategy.
4.4 Linear Penalty Scheme
In this section, we parallel the work of Section 4.3 but for the objective function v2
dened in (4.5). By Corollary 4.2.1 with a penalty of the form (x) = s1 (x  )+,
the associated HJB equation is given by8<: (r   ) zgz (z)  
g2z(z)
gzz(z)
  g (z) + s0   s11f1 z>g (1  z   ) = 0;
limz"1 gzz (z) =  1; g (0) = s0 s1(1 ) :
(4.22)
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4.4.1 MCI and Optimal Strategy
Here again, we propose to solve the HJB (4.22) by rst considering the following
FBP:8<: y2	^yy +
h
 r+

y   s1

1fy>g
i
	^y    	^ +
s0 s1(1 )1fy>g

= 0; 0 < 0  y <1
	^yy (0) = 0, 	^y (0) =  1; 	^y () =    1; limy!1 	^ (y) = s0 s1(1 ) :
(4.23)
As we will show, the solution to (4.23) can be expressed in terms of conuent
hypergeometric functions of the rst kind dened as
 (j; k;x) = 1 +
1X
i=1
(j)i
(k)i
xi
i!
; (4.24)
for x 2 R, j 2 R, and k 2 RnZ ; where (j)i = j (j + 1)    (j + i  1). We state in
Lemma 4.4.1 the properties of  which will be useful in the later analysis. Interested
readers are referred to Abramowitz and Stegun [1] for more details.
Lemma 4.4.1 For the conuent hypergeometric function of the rst kind  dened
in (4.24),
(1) k (j; k;x) + x (j + 1; k + 1; x) = k (j + 1; k;x) ;
(2) (1 + j   k)  (j; k;x) + (k   1) (j; k   1;x) = j (j + 1; k;x) ;
(3)  (j; k;x) =  (k   j; k; x) ex;
(4) For n = 1; 2; :::; d
n(j;k;x)
dxn
=
(j)n
(k)n
 (j + n; k + n;x) ;
(5) If k > j > 0;  (j; k;x) =  (k)
 (k j) (j)
R 1
0
exttj 1 (1  t)k j 1 dt > 0:
The solution to the FBP (4.23) is given in Lemma 4.4.2 and its proof can be
found in the Appendix. The main di¢ culty lies in the analysis of the conuent
hypergeometric function .
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Lemma 4.4.2 The solution to the FBP (4.23) on y 2 [0;1) is given by
	^ (y) =
8><>:
(1 +)0
(+  ) 

y
0
 
+
(1  )0
(  +)+

y
0
+
+ s0

; y 2 [0; ]
(1 )
A

A+1;B; s1() 1
  
y
A

 
A;B; s1 (y) 1

+ s0 s1(1 )

; y 2 (;1);
(4.25)
where A =   , B = +   +1, and  are as dened in (4.9). The boundaries
 and 0 are respectively given by  =  s1 (x) 1 and 0 = =0; where x is
the unique solution on ( 1; 0) to
1  +
(+    )  
  1
0 +
1   
(    +) +
+ 1
0

A

 (A+ 1; B;x)
=
(1  )

 (A;B;x) +
(1  )A

x (A+ 1; B;x) ; (4.26)
and 0 is dened in Lemma 4.3.1. Furthermore, 	^ is strictly convex, strictly de-
creasing and C2 in [0;1).
Lemma 4.4.3 Let 	 be the Legendre transform 	^, i.e.
	(z) = inf
y2[0;1)
n
	^ (y) + yz
o
; z 2 (0; 1]:
Then 	(z) solves (4.22) and
	(z) = v2 (z) := sup
2
Ew;m
Z e
0

s0   s1

Mt  W t
Mt
  

+

dt

;
for z = w
m
2 (0; 1]: Furthermore, 	 is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and C2
in (0; 1].
Theorem 4.4.1 For z 2 (0; 1];
v2 (z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1 )
A

A+1;B; s1() 1
  
I2( z)
A

 
A;B; s1 (I2 ( z)) 1

 I2 ( z) z + s0 s1(1 )
; z 2 (0; 1  );
(1 +)0
(+  ) 

I2( z)
0
 
+
(1  )0
(  +)+

I2( z)
0
+
  I2 ( z) z + s0 ; z 2 [1  ; 1];
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and the optimal trading strategy is given by
2 (z) =
8><>:
 r
2
(A+1)(A+2;B; s1(I2( z)) 1)
(A+1;B; s1(I2( z)) 1) ; z 2 (0; 1  );
 r
2z
(1 +)(  1)
(+  )

I2( z)
0
  1
 

I2( z)
0
+ 1
; z 2 [1  ; 1]:
where I2 := (	^y) 1 is the inverse function of 	^y: The constants A; B; ; 0; 
are as given in Lemma 4.4.2.
The proof of Lemma 4.4.3 and Theorem 4.4.1 is similar to that of Lemma 4.3.2
and Theorem 4.3.1, respectively, and are therefore omitted. Next, we study the
behavior of 2.
Proposition 4.4.1 For z 2 [1  ; 1] ; 2 (z) = 1 (z) ; where 1 (z) is given in
Theorem 4.3.1; for z 2 (0; 1  ); 2 (z) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. We rst show that 2 (z) = 

1 (z) on [1  ; 1] : Clearly, 1 (1) = 2 (1) =
0. By Theorems 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, it remains to show that I1( z)
y0
= I2( z)
0
for z 2
[1  ; 1). Since I1 = ( ^y) 1 and I2 = (	^y) 1, we have
 ^y (I1 ( z)) = 	^y (I2( z)) =  z: (4.27)
Di¤erentiating the rst equation in both (4.8) and (4.25), we obtain8><>:  ^y (y) =
1 +
+  

y
y0
  1
+ 1 
 
  +

y
y0
+ 1
; y 2 [y0; y] ;
	^y (y) =
1 +
+  

y
0
  1
+ 1 
 
  +

y
0
+ 1
; y 2 [0; ] :
Using (7.3), (4.27) can be rewritten as


I1 ( z)
y0

= 

I2 ( z)
0

=  z:
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For a given z 2 [1   ; 1); both I1( z)
y0
and I2( z)
0
solve for  (x) =  z on (1;1).
Given that  was shown to be a strictly increasing function on (1;1) (see proof
of Lemma 3.1 in Appendix), it follows that I1( z)
y0
= I2( z)
0
which further implies
2 (z) = 

1 (z) on [1  ; 1).
Next, we show that 2 is strictly decreasing on (0; 1  ) : Recall that for z 2
(0; 1) ;
	(z) = inf
y2[0;1)
n
	^ (y) + yz
o
= 	^ (I2 ( z)) + I2 ( z) z:
We deduce that
	z (z) = I2 ( z) and 	zz (z) =   1
	^yy (I2 ( z))
: (4.28)
By the rst relation in (4.28), for y = I2 ( z) 2 (;1);
d2
dz
=
d2
dy
dy
dz
=
d2
dy
d2v2
dz2
.
By Lemma 4.4.3, v2 is strictly concave on (0; 1] which implies d
2v2
dz2
< 0: Thus, it
remains to show that d

2
dy
> 0 for y 2 (;1): For y 2 (;1) ; i.e., z 2 (0; 1  ) ;
by applying Properties (2) and (4) of Lemma 4.4.1 together with some algebraic
manipulations, we obtain
d2
dy
/ d
dy
"

 
A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1


 
A+ 1; B; s1 (y) 1
#
/ (A+ 2 B) (A+ 2; B + 1; s1 (y) 1)(A+ 1; B; s1 (y) 1)
  (A+ 1 B) (A+ 1; B + 1; s1 (y) 1)(A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1):
Since B 2 (A+ 1; A+ 2) ; by Property (5) of Lemma 4.4.1, the functions (A +
2; B + 1; s1 (y) 1); (A+ 1; B; s1 (y) 1); and (A+ 1; B + 1; s1 (y) 1) are
all positive for y 2 (;1). Since 	^ is strictly convex on (;1) and
	^yy / 
 
A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1

;
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we deduce that 
 
A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1

> 0 for y 2 (;1) : It follows that d

2
dy
> 0
for y 2 (;1). The proof is therefore complete.
4.4.2 Numerical Examples
In this subsection, we provide several numerical examples in connection with the
results of Section 4.4.1, and study the sensitivity of the MCI strategy to some key
model parameters. For all the following examples, we set r = 0:03;  = 0:1;  = 0:2;
s0 = 1;  = 0:1; and a threshold drawdown level of  = 0:2 to initialize the income
penalty.
Example 4.4.1 (MCI and MCI strategy) We consider  = 0:05; and di¤erent
levels for the penalty rate s1. The MCI (left plot) and MCI strategies (right plot)
are displayed in Figure 4.4.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
16
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Figure 4.4. MCI (right) and MCI strategy (left) with di¤erent penalty rates
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The left plot shows that the MCI v2 is increasing and concave (as expected).
From the right plot, we observe that
 in the non-penalty region z 2 [0:8; 1], the MCI strategy again coincides with
the MLDP strategy;
 in the penalty region z 2 (0; 0:8) ; the MCI strategy is independent of s1 which
is a consequence of removing the terminating drawdown level .
It immediately follows that the MCI v2 is monotone decreasing in the penalty
rate s1 (as we can observe from the left plot). It is also interesting to note that
as the fund level increases, the manager invests more conservatively as the fear of
incurring a larger penalty dominates the appetite to take on more risk to possibly
lower the penalty rate.
Example 4.4.2 (Impact of ) In this example, by setting di¤erent levels of ,
we obtain the corresponding MCI strategies in Figure 4.5. Note that a smaller 
implies a longer expected time horizon. Intuitively speaking, the manager intends
to adopt a more aggressive strategy when the expected time horizon is longer, as we
see in the non-penalty region z 2 [0:8; 1]. However, the trend is for the most part
reversed in the penalty region z 2 (0; 0:8): Indeed, given that the income penalty is
high for low fund levels under the linear penalty scheme, a manager with a longer
investment time horizon tends to adopt a more conservative strategy to avoid the
risk of a heavy income penalty over a longer time period.
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Figure 4.5. Impact of  on MCI strategy
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Chapter 5
A Pair of Optimal
Reinsurance-Investment
Strategies in the Two-sided Exit
Framework
5.1 Introduction
Given that investment is an integral component of an insurers risk management
practices, risk models taking both insurance and investment risks into consideration
have received a great deal of attention in the literature. In addition to investment,
insurers frequently rely on reinsurance to control their risk exposure. Subject to
a control on investment and reinsurance, optimization problems under various ob-
jective functions have become a popular research topic in the actuarial literature.
Common objective functions include the ruin probability minimization (e.g., Young
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[88], Promislow and Young [78], Chen et al. [40], Bayraktar and Zhang [28]), the be-
quest goal optimization (e.g., Bayraktar et al. [22][23], Bayraktar and Young [27]),
the expected utility maximization (e.g., Liu and Ma [67], Bai and Guo [15], Liang
and Bayraktar [64], Liang and Yuen [66]), as well as the traditional mean-variance
portfolio optimization criteria (e.g., Bäuerle [19], Bai and Zhang [16], Bi et al. [30],
Zeng et al. [90]).
In this chapter, for a controlled surplus process fXut gt0 under a reinsurance-
investment strategy u, we study the optimal reinsurance-investment problem in the
so-called two-sided exit framework, namely
sup
u
P ( b <  0 ^ ejXu0 = x) ; (5.1)
and
inf
u
P ( 0 <  b ^ ejXu0 = x) ; (5.2)
where x 2 [0; b],  0 = inf ft  0 : Xut < 0g,  b = inf ft  0 : Xut > bg, and e is
a random time horizon modelled by an independent exponential random variable
with mean 1=. Objective (5.1) proposes to maximize the probability that the
insurers surplus reaches the target b before the time of ruin and the end of the
time horizon e, while objective (5.2) minimizes the probability that ruin occurs
before the surplus reaches the target b and the end of the time horizon e.
Under objectives (5.1) and (5.2), we consider an insurer whose surplus is mod-
elled by a di¤usion process. In addition, the insurer can purchase proportional
reinsurance and invest its wealth in a nancial market consisting of a risk-free asset
and a risky asset, where the dynamics of the latter is assumed to be correlated with
the insurance surplus. By applying the dual approach and solving the associated
HamiltonJacobiBellman (HJB) equation, an explicit expression for the optimal
reinsurance-investment strategy are obtained for both objectives (5.1) and (5.2). A
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closer examination of the resulting optimal reinsurance-investment strategies will
reveal the following three main implications which we highlight here:
1. With the introduction of the time factor e (measuring the insurers toler-
ance to time) to the objectives (5.1) and (5.2), the corresponding optimal
reinsurance-investment strategy may become more aggressive as the surplus
level increases. This is in contrast to e.g., Promislow and Young [78] and Bai
and Guo [14] where the optimal innite-time reinsurance-investment strategy
is always more conservative as the surplus level increases (which may not
always be consistent with industry practices);
2. The optimal reinsurance-investment strategy under objective (5.1) (objective
(5.2) resp.) is always more aggressive (conservative resp.) than the strategy
to minimize the innite-time ruin probability in Promislow and Young [78];
3. The optimal reinsurance-investment strategy under objective (5.1) is inde-
pendent of the target level b, a result similar to Bayraktar and Young [27]
under the objective of reaching a bequest goal.
It is worth pointing out that the reinsurance control plays an important role
in the derivation of an explicit expression for the optimal strategy under objec-
tives (5.1) and (5.2). In fact, if the insurer cannot manage the insurance risk by
purchasing reinsurance, the corresponding HJB equation appears di¢ cult to solve
analytically (see Remark 5.3.1 for more details on this point). Also note that Luo et
al. [70] considered objective (5.1) in the same context but with only the reinsurance
control (without investment).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the math-
ematical framework under which the objectives (5.1) and (5.2) will be examined is
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formally dened. In Section 5.3, explicit expressions for the optimal reinsurance-
investment strategies are given, and various implications are later discussed. In
Section 5.4, some numerical examples are provided to support the theoretical nd-
ings of Section 5.3. Some tedious derivations are postponed to the Appendix.
5.2 Problem formulation
Consider a ltered complete probability space (
;F ;F = fFtgt0;P) satisfying the
usual conditions. Following Promislow and Young [78] and Bai and Guo [14], we
assume the dynamics of the claim payment process is governed by
dCt = mdt  dW 1t ; (5.3)
wherem and  are positive constants and fW 1t gt0 is an F-adapted standard Brown-
ian motion. Suppose that the premium rate is given by c = (1 + )m, where the
constant  > 0 is the insurers safety loading. The dynamics of the primary surplus
process without reinsurance and investment is given by
dUt = cdt  dCt = mdt+ dW 1t : (5.4)
The primary surplus model (5.4) is a commonly used approximation to the classical
Cramér-Lundberg model.
Suppose that the insurer can manage the insurance liabilities by purchasing
(proportional) reinsurance or acquiring new business (e.g., Bäuerle [19]). For t  0,
the reinsurance/new business level is denoted by the risk exposure rate qt 2 [0;+1)
where
 when qt 2 [0; 1], it corresponds to situations where the insurer purchases a
proportional reinsurance coverage. More specically, the insurer diverts part
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of the premium income to the reinsurer at rate (1   qt)(1 + )m while the
reinsurer is responsible for (1   qt)100% of the claim payment. Here, the
reinsurers safety loading  is assumed to satisfy the common assumption
 >  > 0: (5.5)
 when qt 2 [1;+1), it corresponds to situations where the insurer acquires
new business by, e.g., acting as a reinsurer for other insurers whose risks
are identically distributed. Hence, the insurers safety loading on the new
business (i.e., the portion of the risk exposure qt over 1) is assumed to be 
(see also Equation (5.6)). We continue to assume that the insurers safety
loading on the original insurance business is .
We exclude the strategies qt < 0 because this implies the insurer over-reinsures
the original underwritten business (by transferring more than 100% of the business
to reinsurers), a practice which is not permitted under insurance regulation.
Remark 5.2.1 Although there exists other forms of reinsurance contracts which
may be more widely used in practice (e.g., stop-loss, excess-of-loss; see, e.g., Borch
[31] and Arrow [7] for a more detailed discussion), we have chosen to limit the
present analysis to the case involving proportional reinsurance only. This choice
was made for reasons of mathematical tractability as it leads to a closed-form ex-
pression to the corresponding HJB equation. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out
that proportional reinsurance was shown to be the optimal form of reinsurance un-
der certain setups (see, e.g., Theorem 3.1 of Cai et al. [35] and Theorem 13 in
Centeno and Simões [38]).
Remark 5.2.2 (5.5) is a common assumption made in the literature, indicating
that reinsurance business is usually more expensive. To better understand the as-
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sumption, we rst notice that the case  <  should be excluded as it leads to an
arbitrage opportunity if the insurer reinsures the whole portfolio. In practice, the
case  =  seldomly happens for several reasons. First, undertaking the insured risk
incurs additional costs for reinsurers. Second, to get rid of the undesirable part of
the insured risk, in general insurers are willing to accept a higher loading. Third,
 >  also results from reinsurersgrowing market power (see, e.g., Cummins and
Weiss [45]).
Under the reinsurance strategy fqtgt0, the dynamics of the surplus process
follows
dRt = dUt   (1  qt)(1 + )mdt+ (1  qt)dCt
= (    + qt)mdt+ qtdW 1t : (5.6)
We assume that the insurer can also invest in a nancial market consisting of a
risk-free bond with interest rate r > 0 and a risky stock whose price is governed by
dSt = Stdt+ St
 
dW 1t + ~dW
2
t

;
where  > r,  > 0,  2 ( 1; 1), ~ :=
p
1  2, and fW 2t gt0 is another F-adapted
standard Brownian motion, independent of fW 1t gt0. We denote by t the amount
of surplus invested in the stock at time t, and fXut gt0 the corresponding insurance
surplus process under the reinsurance-investment strategy u := (qt; t)t0. Apart
from the risky investment, the balance of the surplus is invested in the risk-free
bond. Thus, by (5.6), the dynamics of the insurers surplus follows
dXut = (X
u
t   t)rdt+ t
dSt
St
+ dRt
= [rXut +m(    + qt) + (  r)t] dt+ (qt + t)dW 1t + ~tdW 2t ;
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or equivalently,
dXut = [rX
u
t +m(    + qt) + (  r)t] dt+
p
2q2t + 2qtt + 
22tdWt;
(5.7)
with initial surplus Xu0 = x > 0 and fWtgt0 is dened as
Wt =
qt + tp
2q2t + 2qtt + 
22t
W 1t +
~tp
2q2t + 2qtt + 
22t
W 2t ; t  0.
Note that it is straightforward to show that the quadratic variation hW it = t and
thus fWtgt0 is a F-adapted standard Brownian motion by Lévys characterization
of Brownian motion.
Throughout the chapter, we also assume that

  r

 m

: (5.8)
Although the risk exposure rate qt is assumed to be nonnegative, one will later see
that the unconstrained optimal reinsurance strategies indeed will be nonnegative
under condition (5.8), and hence correspond to the optimal reinsurance strategies
with constraint. Note that condition (5.8) is clearly satised if   0, i.e. the
insurance risk and nancial risk are either negatively correlated or independent.
Heuristically, when   0, both the optimal reinsurance strategy qt and the opti-
mal investment strategy t should be positive. Indeed, due to the safety loading
condition (5.5) and the positiveness of the market price of risk (   r)=, there
is a natural hedge in holding a long position in both the insurance and nancial
markets when   0. For  > 0, condition (5.5) implies that the insurer will be dis-
couraged from over reinsuring if the reinsurance premium rate  is high or the ratio
m= is large, where the latter condition is consistent with Promislow and Young
[78] which states that the di¤usion approximation (5.3) is reasonable in actuarial
practice when the ratio m= is large so that the probability of realizing negative
claim payments is small.
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Denition 5.2.1 (Admissible strategies) The pair u = (qt; t)t0 is called an
admissible reinsurance-investment strategy, i.e., u 2 , if it satises the following
conditions:
(1) u is F-progressively measurable;
(2) qt 2 [0;+1) a.s. for any t  0;
(3)
R t
0
(q2s + 
2
s)ds <1 a.s. for any t  0.
For the threshold levels 0 and b with 0  x  b, we recall that  0 = inf ft  0 : Xut < 0g
and  b = inf ft  0 : Xut > bg are two rst passage times of the controlled wealth
process fXut gt0. The main objective of this chapter is to study the optimal
reinsurance-investment problems under the two-sided exit framework, i.e.,
 + (x) = sup
u2
Px ( b <  0 ^ e) = sup
u2
Ex

e b1fb<0g

; (5.9)
and
   (x) = inf
u2
Px ( 0 <  b ^ e) = inf
u2
Ex

e 01f0<bg

: (5.10)
For ease of notation, we denote Px the law of Xu given that Xu0 = x 2 [0; b].
Although the two objective functions (5.9) and (5.10) appear to be similar (in
particular when  = 0, (5.9) and (5.10) are equivalent), we will see that their corre-
sponding reinsurance-investment strategies can be quite di¤erent. Interestingly, we
also nd that the associated optimal strategies are closely related to the strategy
of minimizing the innite-time ruin probability, namely
inf
u2
Px ( 0 <1) ; (5.11)
studied by Promislow and Young [78] and Bai and Guo [14]. Suppose the optimal
reinsurance-investment strategies for objectives (5.9)(5.11) are denoted by u+ :=
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(q+; 

+), u

  := (q

 ; 

 ) and u

0 := (q

0; 

0), respectively. We nd that
u+  u0  u ;
where is the relation of aggressiveness which is dened as follows.
Denition 5.2.2 For ui = (qi;t; i;t)t0 2 , i = f1; 2g, we say that u1 is more
aggressive than u2, denoted by u1  u2, if for any t  0, P-a.s.,
q1;t  q2;t  0; and 1;t  2;t  0;
or
q1;t  q2;t  0; and 1;t  2;t  0:
In other words, u1 is more aggressive than u2, if the insurer buys less reinsurance
and takes a larger position (either short or long) in the nancial market.
We refer the reader to Theorem 5.3.5 and Remark 5.3.4 for more details on this
assertion.
5.3 Main results
5.3.1 Objective function  +
We rst investigate objective (5.9). From (5.7), for any u = (q; ) 2 [0;1)R and
(x) 2 C2, we dene a di¤erential operator Au as
Au = [rx+ (  r) +m(    + q)]x +
1
2
 
2q2 + 2q + 22

xx   ;
(5.12)
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where x (xx resp.) denotes the rst (second resp.) order derivative of  with
respect to x.
By a standard argument, we rst provide a verication theorem for the opti-
mization problem. The proof of Theorem 5.3.1 is standard, and is thus omitted.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Verication theorem) Suppose that a function (x) : [0; b]!
[0; 1] satises the following conditions:
(1) (x) 2 C2[0; b] is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(2) for any u 2 [0;1) R, Au(x)  0 for x 2 (0; b);
(3) there exists an admissible feedback strategy u+ : [0; b]! [0;1)R such that
Au+(x) = 0 for x 2 (0; b);
(4)  (0) = 0 and  (b) = 1.
Then  (x) =  + (x) on [0; b], u+ is an optimal reinsurance-investment strategy,
and  + (x) is the associated objective function dened in (5.9).
From Theorem 5.3.1, we obtain the associated HJB equation for objective (5.9):8><>:
sup
u2[0;1)R
fAu(x)g = 0; x 2 (0; b);
 (0) = 0 and  (b) = 1:
(5.13)
Applying the rst-order condition to (5.13) yields8<: mx + xx2q+ + xx+ = 0;(  r)x + xxq+ + xx2+ = 0:
Solving the above linear system, we obtain
q+ =
[(  r)   m]x
2~2xx
; + =
[m   (  r)]x
2~2xx
: (5.14)
76
By substituting (5.14) into the HJB equation (5.13), we obtain8<: [rx m(   )]x     
2x
xx
= 0; x 2 (0; b);
 (0) = 0 and  (b) = 1;
(5.15)
where
 =
(  r)2 2   2 (  r) m + 22m2
222~2
> 0: (5.16)
In order to solve (5.15), we rst consider the corresponding free boundary prob-
lem (FBP):8<: y2^yy (y) + (  r) y^y (y)  ^ (y) m (   ) y = 0; 0 < yb < y < y0;^y (y0) = 0; ^y (yb) =  b; ^ (y0) = 0; ^ (yb) + byb = 1:
(5.17)
The solution to the FBP (5.17) is given in Lemma 5.3.1. The proof can be found
in the Appendix.
Lemma 5.3.1 The solution to the FBP (5.17) is given by
^ (y) =
(   )my
r
"
1   
+    

y
y0
+ 1
+
+   1
+    

y
y0
  1
  1
#
; y 2 [yb; y0];
(5.18)
where  =
 ( r )
p
( r )2+4
2
, y0 = yb,
yb =
 r 
(1   ) [rb  (   )m] + (   )m(1   )1 + > 0,
and  is the unique solution in (1;+1) to
1   
 
x1 + +
+   1
+
x1     +    
+ 
(   )m  rb
(   )m = 0.
Furthermore, ^ 2 C2 [yb; y0] is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on [yb; y0].
Lemma 5.3.2 shows that the Legendre transform of the solution to the FBP
(5.17) is the solution to (5.15), and corresponds to the value function  +.
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Lemma 5.3.2 For ^ given in (5.18), consider its Legendre transform dened as
 (x) = inf
y2[yb;y0]
n
^ (y) + xy
o
; x 2 [0; b] : (5.19)
Then,  (x) solves (5.15) and furthermore  (x) =  + (x) on [0; b], where  + (x) is
the value function dened in (5.9).
Proof. From the boundary conditions in (5.17) and Lemma 5.3.1, we recall
that ^y (yb) =  b and ^ (y) is strictly convex on [yb; y0]. This implies ^ (y) + by is
increasing on [yb; y0] and attains its inmum at y = yb such that (b) = ^ (yb)+byb =
1. A similar argument yields  (0) = ^ (y0) = 0.
For x 2 (0; b), the optimizer y 2 (yb; y0) of (5.19) solves the equation
^y (y) =  x: (5.20)
By Lemma 5.3.1, we deduce the optimizer y = I ( x) ; where I := (^y) 1 is the
inverse function of ^y. It follows that
 (x) = ^ (y) + xy = ^ (I( x)) + xI( x); (5.21)
for x 2 (0; b). Taking the rst and second order of derivatives to (5.21) with respect
to x yields
x (x) = y
 = I( x); xx (x) =  
1
^yy (y
)
=   1
^yy (I( x))
: (5.22)
Using (5.20)(5.22), it is straightforward to verify that  (x) solves the HJB equa-
tion (5.15). Moreover, since ^ is strictly decreasing, strictly convex and C2 on
[yb; y0] ; we deduce that  is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and C2 on [0; b] :
Therefore, by Theorem 5.3.1, we conclude that  (x) =  + (x) on [0; b].
The solution to objective (5.9) is given in the next theorem, and the proof can
be found in the Appendix.
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Theorem 5.3.2 For x 2 (0; b), the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy u+ =
(q+; 

+) for objective (5.9) is given by
q+(x) = A++

I( x)
y0
+ 1
  A+ 

I( x)
y0
  1
; (5.23)
+(x) = B++

I( x)
y0
+ 1
 B+ 

I( x)
y0
  1
; (5.24)
where
A+ =
[m  (  r)] (   )m (+   1) (1   )
2~2r(+    )
;
B+ =
[(  r)   m] (   )m (+   1) (1   )
2~2r(+    )
;
and the associated value function is given by
 + (x) =
(   )m(1   )(1  +)
r(+    ) I( x)
"
I( x)
y0
+ 1
 

I( x)
y0
  1#
;
where I = (^y)
 1. The function ^ and the constants , yb, y0,  are given in
Lemma 5.3.1.
Remark 5.3.1 As pointed out earlier, the reinsurance control plays an important
role in the derivation of an explicit solution to problem (5.9). If the insurer cannot
manage the insurance risk by purchasing reinsurance (i.e., qt  1 for all t  0),
then the corresponding problem has only one control variable . The associated
HJB equation becomes
sup


[rx+ (  r) +m]x +
1
2
 
2 + 2+ 22

xx   

= 0;
which further implies that
rx+ m  (  r)


x    
(  r)2
22
2x
xx
+
2~
2
xx = 0; (5.25)
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with boundary conditions  (0) = 0 and  (b) = 1. In comparison to (5.13), equation
(5.25) contains an additional term involving xx, which makes the identication of
a closed-form expression di¢ cult.
As shown in the following proposition, the optimal reinsurance-investment strat-
egy under objective (5.9) is independent of the target level b. This result largely
simplies the decision-making process as the selection of an appropriate target level
might be di¢ cult in general.
Proposition 5.3.1 The optimal reinsurance-investment strategy u+ = (q

+; 

+) is
independent of b.
Proof. From Theorem 5.3.2, it su¢ ces to show that I( x)=y0 is independent of b.
Recall from (5.20) that ^y (I( x)) =  x; where ^ is given in (5.18). Di¤erentiating
(5.18) yields that
^y(I( x)) =  
(   )m
r
+ g

I( x)
y0

;
where the function
g(z) :=
(   )m
r(+    )

(1   )+z+ 1 + (+   1) z  1

; z 2 (0; 1)
is increasing in z as + > 1 > 0 >  . Moreover, limz#0 g(z) =  1 and
limz"1 g(z) =
( )m
r
> 0. In other words, z = I( x)
y0
is the unique solution to
g (z) =
(   )m
r
  x:
Since the function g() is independent of b, so is I( x)=y0.
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5.3.2 Objective function   
In this subsection, we study objective (5.10) which, for convenience, is restated
here:
   (x) = inf
u2
Px ( 0 <  b ^ e) = inf
u2
Ex

e 01f0<bg

; x 2 [0; b]:
The corresponding optimal reinsurance-investment strategy is denoted as u  := 
q ; 

 

.
By letting (q; )  (0; 0) in the dynamics (5.7) of the surplus process fXut gt0 ;
we rst observe that there exists a safe level ( )m
r
for this objective, i.e.,   (x) = 0
for any x  ( )m
r
.
Proposition 5.3.2 We have    (x) = 0 for x  ( )m
r
. A corresponding optimal
strategy is given by
 
q (x); 

 (x)

= (0; 0) for any x  ( )m
r
.
The existence of this safe level is a signicant di¤erence between objectives
(5.9) and (5.10). Heuristically, objective (5.10) is easier to achieve as the game
ends positively for the insurer when either the target level b is achieved or the
exponential time horizon e expires before ruin. However, an insurer with objective
(5.9) shall reach the target level b before ruin occurs and the end of the time horizon
e. The optimal strategies under these two objectives will be formally compared in
the next section. By Proposition 5.3.2, without loss of generality, we only consider
objective (5.10) when
b  (   )m
r
: (5.26)
The proof of the following verication theorem is also standard, and is therefore
omitted.
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Theorem 5.3.3 (Verication theorem) Suppose that a function  (x) : [0; b]!
[0; 1] satises the following conditions:
(1)  (x) 2 C2[0; b] is strictly decreasing and strictly convex;
(2) for any u 2 [0;1) R, Au(x)  0 for x 2 (0; b);
(3) there exists an admissible feedback strategy u  : [0; b]! [0;1)R such that
Au (x) = 0 for x 2 (0; b);
(4)  (b) = 0 and  (0) = 1.
Then  (x) =    (x) on [0; b], u  is an optimal reinsurance-investment strategy,
and    (x) is the associated objective function dened in (5.10).
Theorem 5.3.3 implies that the associated HJB equation of objective (5.10) is
given by 8><>:
inf
u2[0;1)R
fAu(x)g = 0; x 2 (0; b);
 (b) = 0 and  (0) = 1:
(5.27)
By the rst-order condition of (5.27), the feedback form of the optimal strategy is
given by
q  =
[(  r)  m]x(x)
2~2xx(x)
;   =
[m  (  r)]x(x)
2~2xx(x)
: (5.28)
Substituting (5.28) into the HJB equation (5.27) yields8<: [rx m(   )]x     
2x
xx
= 0; x 2 (0; b);
(b) = 0 and (0) = 1,
(5.29)
where  is given by (5.16). Note that the equation in (5.29) is identical to the one
in (5.15) but with di¤erent boundary conditions. To solve (5.29), we consider the
82
FBP:8<: y2^yy(y) + (  r)y^y(y)  ^(y) +m(   )y = 0; 0  ~yb < y < ~y0;^y (~y0) = 0; ^y (~yb) = b; ^ (~y0) = 1; ^ (~yb)  b~yb = 0:
(5.30)
The solution to the FBP (5.30) is given in Lemma 5.3.3. The proof can be found
in the Appendix.
Lemma 5.3.3 (a) If b < ( )m
r
, the solution to the FBP (5.30) is
^ (y) =
[rb  (   )m]y
r
"
1   
+    

y
~yb
+ 1
+
+   1
+    

y
~yb
  1
  (   )m
(   )m  rb
#
;
for 0 < ~yb  y  ~y0, where  =  ( r )
p
( r )2+4
2
, ~yb = ~y0=~,
~y0 =
 r 
(1   ) [rb  (   )m] ~+ 1 +m(1   )(   )
> 0,
and ~ is the unique solution in (1;+1) to
1   
 
x+ 1 +
+   1
+
x  1 +
+    
+ 
(   )m
(   )m  rb = 0.
Moreover, ^ 2 C2 [~yb; ~y0] is strictly increasing and strictly concave on [~yb; ~y0] :
(b) If b = ( )m
r
; the solution to the FBP (5.30) is
^ (y) =  (   )my
r
"
1
+

y
~y0
+ 1
  1
#
; y 2 [0; ~y0];
where + =
 ( r )+
p
( r )2+4
2
and ~y0 =
r+
(+ 1)( )m . Moreover, ^ 2 C2 [0; ~y0]
is strictly increasing and strictly concave on [0; ~y0].
The proof of Lemma 5.3.4 is similar to that of Lemma 5.3.2, and is therefore
omitted.
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Lemma 5.3.4 For ^ given in Lemma 5.3.3, consider its Legendre transform de-
ned as
 (x) = sup
y2[~yb;~y0]
n
^ (y)  xy
o
; x 2 [0; b] :
It follows that  (x) solves (5.29) and further  (x) =    (x) on [0; b], where    (x)
is the value function dened in (5.10).
The proof of the following theorem can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.3.4 (a) For x 2 (0; b), if b < ( )m
r
, the optimal reinsurance-investment
strategy for objective (5.10) is given by
q (x) = A +

I(x)
~yb
+ 1
  A  

I(x)
~yb
  1
;
 (x) = B +

I(x)
~yb
+ 1
 B  

I(x)
~yb
  1
;
where
A  =
[m  (  r)] [(   )m  rb] (+   1)(1   )
2~2r (+    )
;
B  =
[(  r)   m] [(   )m  rb] (+   1)(1   )
2~2r (+    )
;
and the associated value function is given by
   (x) =
[(   )m  rb] (+   1)(1   )
r (+    ) I(x)
"
I(x)
~yb
+ 1
 

I(x)
~yb
  1#
;
where I(x) := ^
 1
y (x): The function ^ and the constants , ~yb, ~y0, ~ are given in
part (a) of Lemma 5.3.3.
(b) For x 2 (0; b), if b = ( )m
r
, the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy for
objective (5.10) is given by
q (x) =
[m  (  r)] (+   1)[(   )m  rx]
2~2r
;
 (x) =
[(  r)   m] (+   1)[(   )m  rx]
2~2r
;
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and the associated value function is given by
   (x) =
(+   1)~y0[(   )m  rx]
r+

(   )m  rx
(   )m
 1
+ 1
;
where + and ~y0 are given in part (b) of Lemma 5.3.3.
Remark 5.3.2 Note that if b < ( )m
r
, the optimally controlled underlying process,
denoted by Xu

  ; can reach the upper level b with a positive probability as the volatil-
ity of Xu

  is away from zero for all x 2 (0; b). On the contrary, if b = (  )m=r;
Xu

  can not reach the upper level b in any nite time horizon. In fact, by den-
ing Yt := m (   )   rXu

 
t for t  0; one can verify that fYtgt0 is a geometric
Brownian motion, i.e., Yt > 0 a.s., which further implies that X
u 
t <
( )m
r
for
any t  0.
5.3.3 A comparison of optimal strategies
In this section, we compare the optimal reinsurance-investment strategies u+ and
u  with the strategy u

0 = (q

0; 

0) minimizing the innite-time ruin probability,
namely
inf
u2
Px ( 0 <1) : (5.31)
Note that this comparison will be made only in the case where 0 < x < b  ( )m
r
given that    was only analyzed under (5.26). We recall that Promislow and Young
[78] have shown that for 0 < x < b  ( )m
r
;8<: q0 (x) =
[m ( r)][( )m rx]
2~2
;
0 (x) =
[( r) m][( )m rx]
2~2
:
(5.32)
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Theorem 5.3.5 For 0 < x < b  ( )m
r
, we have the following relations for the
optimal reinsurance-investment strategies u+; u

  and u

0 given in Theorems 5.3.2,
5.3.4, and equation (5.32), respectively:
(1) q+(x)  q0(x)  q (x)  0;
(2) +(x)  0(x)   (x)  0 if  r  m ; +(x)  0(x)   (x)  0 if
 r

 m

.
Proof. (1) By the condition  r

 m

in (5.8), q+(x); q

0(x); q

 (x)  0 for any
x 2 (0; b). Further, by (5.14), (5.15), Lemma 5.3.2 and (5.32), we deduce
q+   q0 =
[(  r)   m] +x
2~2 +xx
  [m  (  r)] [(   )m  rx]
2~2
=
m  (  r)
2~2 +x

 ( 
+
x )
2
 +xx
+ [rx  (   )m] +x

=
m  (  r)
2~2 +x
 +
 0;
where the last inequality is due to condition (5.8) and Theorem 5.3.1. Similarly, by
(5.28), (5.29), (5.32) and Lemma 5.3.4, we can show that
q0   q  =
[(  r)   m] [rx  (   )m]
2~2
  [(  r)   m] 
 
x
2~2  xx
=
m  (  r)
2~2  x

  [rx  (   )m]  x + 
(  x )
2
  xx

=  m  (  r)
2~2  x
  
 0:
(2) When  r

= m

, it is clear that +(x) = 

0(x) = 

 (x)  0. When
 r

6= m

, one can see that
q(x) =
1
 r

  m

m  (  r)
2
(x); (5.33)
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where (q; ) stands for any of the three optimal strategies (q+; 

+); (q

0; 

0), and
(q ; 

 ). Since
m ( r)
2
 0 by (5.8), the result of part (2) then follows imme-
diately from relation (5.33) and part (1).
The condition m
v
 () r

is used to determine the sign of . Intuitively,
part (2) of Theorem 5.3.5 indicates that the optimal strategy is to long (short
resp.) the stock if its Sharpe ratio  r

is larger (less resp.) than the benchmark
m
v
. Further, note that when   0, both  and q (condition (5.8)) are positive
because of the diversication benet between the insurance and the nancial risks
together with the positiveness of  and  r

.
Remark 5.3.3 If 0 < x < b < ( )m
r
; u0 is also an optimal strategy for the
objective functions (5.9) and (5.10) in the innite-time horizon, i.e.,
sup
u2
Px ( b <  0) ; (5.34)
and
inf
u2
Px ( 0 <  b) : (5.35)
In fact, (5.31), (5.34), and (5.35) fall into the more general setup of Bäuerle and
Bayraktar [20] which have shown that the optimal strategy is the one that maximizes
the ratio of the drift to the volatility squared of the underlying process (5.7). Note
that the approach in Bäuerle and Bayraktar [20] does not hold for a random (or
nite) maturity setting such as in objectives (5.9) and (5.10) as the time-change
arguments do not apply then.
Note that the case b = ( )m
r
is specically excluded from Remark 5.3.3 as
u0 is clearly not an optimal strategy to (5.34). One can show (using the similar
arguments as in Remark 5.3.2) that the controlled process Xu

0 can not reach the
safe level ( )m
r
in a nite time horizon.
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Remark 5.3.4 In Theorem 5.3.5, it is shown that
u+  u0  u ;
where is the relation of aggressiveness dened in Denition 5.2.2. Therefore,
the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy u+ (u

  resp.) is more aggressive (con-
servative resp.) than the strategy u0. This is consistent with the underlying objective
of these strategies:
 under objective (5.9) (which is the harshest of the three), the insurer takes on
more risk as it shall not only avoid ruin but reach the target level within the
time period;
 under objective (5.10) (which is the most moderate of the three), the insurer
takes on less risk as it only requires the insurer to meet one of the following
two conditions: no ruin before e or reaching the target level b before ruin.
5.4 Numerical examples
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to support the theoretic results
of Section 5.3. Most notably, the e¤ect of some model parameters on the optimal
reinsurance-investment strategies will be examined. In the following examples, we
consider the following joint set of exogenous parameters:  = 0:08, r = 0:05,m = 3,
v = 1,  = 0:2,  = 0:1 and  = 0:2. The other parameters x; b;  and  may vary.
Example 5.4.1 (E¤ect of ) In this example, we examine the e¤ect of the ex-
pected length of the time horizon on the optimal reinsurance-investment strategies.
We let  = 0 and b = 1:
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Figure 5.1. E¤ect of  on (q+; 
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Figure 5.2. E¤ect of  on (q ; 

 )
Figure 5.1 (Figure 5.2 resp.) shows that the optimal reinsurance-investment
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strategy under objective (5.9) (objective (5.10) resp.) increases (decreases resp.) in
. The opposite trend result from the essential di¤erence between the two objective
functions. As  increases (i.e. the expected time horizon becomes shorter), an
insurer with objective (5.9) has to adopt a more aggressive strategy by undertaking
more insurance and nancial risks to reach the target level b over a shorter time
period. On the contrary, Figure 5.2 shows that, as  increases, the insurer with
objective (5.10) will adopt a more conservative strategy as it only requires the insurer
to avoid ruin over a relatively short time period.
Example 5.4.2 (E¤ect of x) In this example, we examine the e¤ect of the sur-
plus level on the optimal reinsurance-investment strategies. We consider  = 0 and
b = 1:
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that in general the strategies (q+; 

+) and (q

 ; 

 ) are
not monotone in the surplus level x. More specically, when the surplus level x is
small, both strategies decrease in x to avoid ruin (by reducing the risk position).
For larger values of surplus x, an insurer will adopt a more aggressive strategy to
win the game by achieving the target level b. Moreover, when  is large (i.e. an
expected shorter time horizon), the strategy u+ becomes monotone increasing in x
as the time constraint factor for the insurer to reach the target level b dominates.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 also show that u+ is increasing in  and u

  is decreasing in ,
a conclusion consistent with the last example.
Example 5.4.3 (Comparison of optimal strategies) In this example, we com-
pare the three optimal reinsurance-investment strategies u+, u

0, and u

 . We let
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b = 1.
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The left panels of Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that q+  q0  q   0. Furthermore,
the right panel of Figure 5.5 shows that +  0     0 if m   r , and the
right panel of Figure 5.6 shows that +  0    < 0 if m >  r . All of
them are consistent with Theorem 5.3.5 and the implications have been discussed
in Remark 3.4.
Example 5.4.4 (E¤ect of b on u ) Since u

+ is independent of b as shown in
Proposition 5.3.1, we only examine the e¤ect of b on u . We let  = 0 and  = 0:05.
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Figure 5.7. E¤ect of b on u 
Figure 5.7 shows that u  decreases in b, i.e., for a high target level b, the insurer
with objective (5.10) tends to adopt a more conservative strategy to avoid ruin
because the chance of winning the game by reaching a high target level is small.
Example 5.4.5 (E¤ect of ) In this example, we examine the e¤ect of  on the
optimal reinsurance-investment strategies. We let  = 0:05 and b = 2.
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The right panels of Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show that the optimal investment strate-
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gies + and 

  are more aggressive when the correlation between the insurance and
nancial risks is strong. Correspondingly, to diversify the entire porfolio risk, the
reinsurance strategies q+ and q

  also become more aggressive as  approaches  1
or 1 as shown in the left panels of Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
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Chapter 6
Equilibrium
Investment-Reinsurance Strategy
in a Combined Reinsurance Class
6.1 Introduction
An integrated reinsurance and investment strategy is commonly employed by an
insurer (cedent) for the purpose of increasing its underwriting capacity, stabilizing
the underwriting results, protecting itself against catastrophic losses, and achiev-
ing nancial growth. In this chapter, we study an optimal reinsurance-investment
problem for an insurer under a mean-variance criterion in a dynamic setting. We
model the insurers basic surplus process, that is, the surplus process without any
reinsurance-investment strategy, by a spectrally negative Lévy process. The model
is widely employed in the context of risk theory and ruin theory (see, e.g., Yang
and Zhang [87], Chiu and Yin [43], Avram et al. [12], Landriault et al. [62]) in the
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actuarial science literature. It is a generalization of many insurance models studied
in the context of reinsurance-investment problems, including the Brownian motion
model (see, e.g., Promislow and Young [78]), the classical Cramér-Lundberg (C-L)
model (see, e.g., Zeng et. al. [90]), and the jump di¤usion model (e.g., Zeng et. al.
[91]).
In particular, we consider two types of combinations, referred to as type I rein-
surance policy (type II reinsurance policy resp.). Under type I policy, the reinsurer
covers a proportion of the excess loss (the part exceeding a retention level) for each
individual claim, while the insurer covers the remaining. This type of policy is
seldom studied in the literature of nding optimal reinsurance policies, especially
under dynamic settings. Under static settings, a similar reinsurance policy called
change-loss policy is studied extensively (see, e.g., Cai et al. [35], Tan and Weng
[85]). The di¤erence between a type I policy and a change-loss policy is that the
latter is applied to aggregate claims instead of each individual claim. Under type II
policy, an insurer covers a proportion of each individual loss up to a retention level,
while the remaining is ceded to a reinsurer. A rich literature has been contributed
to investigating the optimal reinsurance under type II policy in both static settings
(see, e.g., Centeno [36], Centeno and Simões [37]) and dynamic settings (see, e.g.,
Zhang et al. [93], Liang and Guo [65]).
By deriving the closed-form equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy under
type I (type II resp.) reinsurance policy, we nd that under the expected value
premium principle, it is optimal for the insurer to transfer all the excess losses
to the reinsurer (to cover all the losses under the retention level resp.). In other
words, we show that the excess-of-loss reinsurance is the optimal reinsurance form
(within the combined class of type I and type II reinsurance policies we consider) for
the time-consistent insurer under a mean-variance criterion. The result is consistent
97
with several works in the literature, where under the expected value principle and
various objective functions, the optimality of the excess-of-loss policy is shown,
including maximizing the expected cumulative discounted dividend pay-outs (see,
e.g., Asmussen et al. [8]), maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth (see,
e.g., Liang and Guo [65], Zeng and Luo [92]), and minimizing the ruin probability
(see, e.g., Zhang et al. [93], Meng and Zhang [72], Bai et al. [13], Zhou and Cai
[95]). Note that the conclusion might not hold under other premium principles (for
instance, the variance principle), and the investigation is left for future research.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the
formulation of the model. Section 6.3 derives the explicit expressions of the equi-
librium reinsurance-investment strategy and the corresponding equilibrium value
function respectively under type I and type II reinsurance policies. Section 6.4
presents some numerical examples to illustrate our ndings. Some technical proofs
are postponed to the Appendix.
6.2 Model Formulation
Let (
;F ;F = fFtgt0 ;P) be a ltered complete probability space satisfying
the usual conditions and T > 0 be a nite time horizon. Consider an insurers
basic surplus process modeled by a spectrally negative Lévy process dened on
(
;F ;F = fFtgt0 ;P) with dynamics
dUt = cdt+ 1dB
(1)
t  
Z 1
0
zN (dt; dz) ; U0 > 0;
where c > 0 is the premium rate, 1 > 0 is the volatility rate,
n
B
(1)
t
o
t0
is an
F -adapted standard Brownian motion, and N (dt; dz) is a Poisson point measure
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representing the number of insurance claims of size (z; z + dz) within the time pe-
riod (t; t + dt). We denote the compensated measure of N(dt; dz) by ~N(dt; dz) =
N(dt; dz) v(z)dt; where v is a Lévy measure such that R1
0
zv (dz) <1; represent-
ing the expected number of insurance claims of size (z; z+dz) within a unit time
interval. The insurers premium c is determined under the expected value principle,
i.e., c = (1 + )
R1
0
zv (dz) ; where  > 0 is the safety loading of the insurer.
The insurer manages the insurance liabilities by purchasing a combined rein-
surance policy (strategy) (mt; pt)t2[0;T ], where mt 2 [0;1) is a retention level and
pt 2 [0; 1]1 is a proportional reinsurance coverage. For an individual claim incurred
at t 2 [0; T ], denoted by Zt; the retained loss of the insurer is represented by
l(Zt) : [0;1)! [0;1) with 0  l(Zt)  Zt; while the reinsurer covers the remain-
ing loss Zt  l(Zt): To be more specic, under type I and type II policy respectively,
the retained loss function takes the form
l(Zt) = Zt1fZtmtg + (mt + pt (Zt  mt))1fZt>mtg; (6.1)
and
l(Zt) = ptZt ^mt: (6.2)
The premium rate of the reinsurance policy is given by
(1 + )
Z 1
0
(z   l(z))v (dz) ;
determined again under the expected value principle, where  is the reinsurers
safety loading. It is commonly assumed in the literature that  > ; indicating that
a reinsurance policy is usually more expensive. Under the reinsurance strategy, the
dynamics of the surplus process is governed by
1We assume that the insurer is not allowed to acquire new reinsurance business on the same
risk, i.e., the case pt > 1 is excluded.
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dRt = dUt   (1 + )
Z 1
0
[z   l(z)]v (dz) dt+
Z 1
0
[z   l(z)]N (dt; dz)
= (1 + )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) dt+ 1dB
(1)
t   (1 + )
Z 1
0
[z   l(z)]v (dz) dt
 
Z 1
0
zN (dt; dz) +
Z 1
0
[z   l(z)]N (dt; dz)
=

(   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
l(z)v (dz)

dt+ 1dB
(1)
t  
Z 1
0
l(z) ~N (dt; dz) :
Furthermore, suppose that the insurer invests in a nancial market consisting
of a risk-free asset with constant interest rate r > 0 and a risky asset governed by
a geometric Brownian motion with dynamics
dSt = Stdt+ 2St

dB
(1)
t +
p
1  2dB(2)t

; S0 > 0;
where  > r, 2 > 0,  2 ( 1; 1), and fB(2)t gt0 is another F -adapted standard
Brownian motion, independent of B(1) and N (dt; dz). We denote by t the amount
of surplus invested in the risky asset at time t and fXut gt0 the corresponding insur-
ance surplus process under a reinsurance-investment strategy u := (mt; pt; t)t2[0;T ].
The dynamics of the surplus process fXut gt2[0;T ] is then given by
dXut = t
dSt
St
+ (Xut   t) rdt+ dRt
=

rXut + (  r)t + (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
l(z)v (dz)

dt
+
q
21 + 212t + 
2
t
2
2dBt  
Z 1
0
l(z) ~N (dt; dz) ; (6.3)
where fBtgt0 is anF -adapted standard Brownian motion, independent ofN(dt; dz):
Denition 6.2.1 (Admissible strategy). Let U be the set of all admissible strate-
gies. A strategy u = (mt; pt; t)t2[0;T ] 2 U if it satises the following conditions:
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(1) u is F -progressively measurable;
(2) 8t 2 [0; T ], mt 2 [0;1) and pt 2 [0; 1];
(3) 8(t; x) 2 [0; T ] R, Et;x[
R T
0
(p2s +m
2
s + 
2
s)ds] <1;
(4) 8(t; x) 2 [0; T ]  R, the stochastic di¤erential equation (6.3) has a unique
strong solution.
The main objective of the chapter is to study the reinsurance-investment
problem for a time-consistent insurer under a mean-variance criterion, i.e.,
sup
u2U
Ju(t; x); (6.4)
where
Ju(t; x) = Et;x[XuT ] 

2
Vart;x[X
u
T ]; (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R, (6.5)
is the mean-variance criterion with  > 0 reecting the insurers degree of risk
aversion.
Problem (6.4) is a time-inconsistent problem in the sense that Bellmans opti-
mality principle fails. We tackle the problem from a non-cooperative game point of
view by dening an equilibrium strategy and its corresponding equilibrium value
function.
Denition 6.2.2 For an admissible strategy u = (mt ; p

t ; 

t )t2[0;T ], we dene the
following strategy
u"s =
8<: ( m; p; ); t  s < t+ ";us; t+ "  s < T;
where ( m; p; ) 2 U := [0;1) [0; 1]R and " 2 R+. If for all (t; x) 2 [0; T ]R,
lim inf
"#0
Ju

(t; x)  Ju"(t; x)
"
 0;
then u is an equilibrium strategy and Ju

(t; x) is the corresponding equilibrium
value function.
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6.3 EquilibriumReinsurance-Investment Strategy
6.3.1 General Framework
Throughout the chapter, we make the following additional integrability condition
on the Lévy measure v : Z 1
1
z2v(dz) <1:
For any u = (m; p; ) 2 U , we dene an integral-di¤erential operator Au as
Au (t; x) := lim
"#0
Et;x


 
t+ ";Xut+"
   (t; x)
"
=

rx+ (  r) + (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + (1 + )
Z 1
0
l(z; t)v (dz)

x(t; x)
+
1
2
 
21 + 212 + 
222

xx (t; x) + t(t; x)
+
Z 1
0
( (t; x  l(z; t))   (t; x)) v (dz) ; (6.6)
where (t; x) 2 C1;2([0; T ]R), t is the rst order partial derivative with respect
to t, and x and xx are respectively the rst and second order partial derivative
with respect to x:
We rst provide a verication theorem. The proof of the theorem is postponed
to the Appendix.
Theorem 6.3.1 (Verication theorem). Suppose that there exist V (t; x), g(t; x) 2
C1;2([0; T ] R) satisfying the following conditions
(1) for all (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R,
sup
u2U
n
AuV (t; x) Au
2
g2(t; x) + g(t; x)Aug(t; x)
o
= 0; (6.7)
and let u denote the optimal value to attain the supremum in (6.7);
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(2) for all (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R,
Aug(t; x) = 0; (6.8)
(3) for x 2 R,
V (T; x) = x and g(T; x) = x: (6.9)
Then u is an equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy, and V (t; x) = Ju

(t; x)
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Furthermore, g(t; x) = Et;x[Xu

T ].
Next, we study the equilibrium strategy and the corresponding equilibrium value
function under the class of type I and type II policies, respectively.
6.3.2 Type I Reinsurance Policy
Under the class of type I reinsurance policies, consider a reinsurance-investment
strategy u^ = (m^t; p^t; ^t)t2[0;T ] : For an individual claim Zt; the retained loss function
of the insurer takes the form
l^ (Zt) = Zt1fZtm^tg + (m^t + p^t (Zt   m^t))1fZt>m^tg; (6.10)
while the reinsurer covers the remaining loss (1  p^t) (Zt   m^t)1fZt>m^tg: Note that
type I reinsurance policy is a generalization of a proportional reinsurance (with
m^t  0) and an excess-of-loss reinsurance (with p^t  0). The main results on the
equilibrium strategy and the corresponding value function are given in Theorem
6.3.2. The proof of the theorem can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 6.3.2 Under the class of type I reinsurance policies, for (t; x) 2 [0; T ]
R, the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy u^ = (m^t ; p^t ; ^

t ) for problem
103
(6.4) is given by 8>>><>>>:
m^(t) = 

e r(T t);
p^(t) = 0;
^(t) = ( r)
22
e r(T t)   1
2
;
(6.11)
and the corresponding equilibrium value function is
V^ (t; x) = er(T t)x+ A(t); (6.12)
where
A(t) =
(  r)2
222
(T   t)
+
Z T
t

er(T s)

  (  r) 1
2
+ (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
(z ^ m^s)v (dz)

 
2
e2r(T s)
 
1  221 + Z 1
0
(z2 ^ m^2s )v (dz)

ds:
Furthermore,
Et;x

X u^

T

= g(t; x) = er(T t)x+ a(t); (6.13)
where
a(t) = A(t)+
(  r)2
222
(T t)+
Z T
t

2
e2r(T s)
 
1  221 + Z 1
0
(z2 ^ m^2s )v (dz)

ds:
Remark 6.3.1 Theorem 6.3.2 implies that within the class of type I reinsurance
policies, the excess-of-loss reinsurance policy is the optimal form for an insurer un-
der a mean-variance criterion. Note that the equilibrium strategy is independent
of the state variable x: The independence results from the constant risk aversion
assumption; see Björk et al. [30] for a detailed discussion. Moreover, the equi-
librium excess-of-loss strategy is independent of the parameters of the risky asset
and the safety loading of the insurer, while the equilibrium investment strategy is
independent of the safety loadings of the insurer and the reinsurer. In other words,
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the equilibrium reinsurance strategy is una¤ected by the nancial market, while the
equilibrium investment strategy is una¤ected by the price of the reinsurance market,
and both strategies are una¤ected by the price of the insurance market.
The behavior of the equilibrium strategy is given in the following proposition.
The proof is straightforward and hence omitted. The intuitions behind the behavior
of the equilibrium strategy will be discussed in details in the numerical analysis.
Proposition 6.3.1 For any t 2 [0; T ], m^t is increasing in  and decreasing in r
and ; ^t is increasing in  and decreasing in r; ; 1; and 2:
6.3.3 Type II Reinsurance Policy
Under the class of type II reinsurance policies, consider a reinsurance-investment
strategy ~u := ( ~mt; ~pt; ~t)t2[0;T ]: For an individual claim Zt; the retained loss function
of the insurer takes the form
~l (Zt; t) = ~ptZt ^ ~mt
= ~ptZt1nZt ~mt~pt o + ~mt1nZt> ~mt~pt o; (6.14)
while the reinsurer covers the remaining loss Zt   ~ptZt ^ ~mt: This case ~pt = 0 is
excluded as it is meaningless for the insurer to undertake the risk at a safety loading
 and cede the same risk at a higher safety loading . A proportional type policy
(with ~mt  +1) is also excluded as we have shown in Subsection 3.2 that it is not
the optimal form. Note that type II policy includes an excess-of-loss policy (with
~pt  1) as a special case. The main results on the equilibrium strategy and the
corresponding value function are summarized in Theorem 6.3.3. The proof of the
theorem can be found in the Appendix.
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Theorem 6.3.3 Under the class of type II reinsurance policies, for (t; x) 2 [0; T ]
R, the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy ~u = ( ~mt ; ~pt ; ~t ) for problem
(6.4) is given by 8>>><>>>:
~m(t) = 

e r(T t);
~p(t) = 1;
~(t) = ( r)
22
e r(T t)   1
2
;
(6.15)
and the corresponding equilibrium value function is
~V (t; x) = V^ (t; x): (6.16)
Furthermore,
Et;x

X ~u

T

= ~g(t; x) = g^(t; x): (6.17)
Remark 6.3.2 Theorem 6.3.3 implies that within the class of type II reinsurance
policies, the excess-of-loss reinsurance policy is also the optimal form for an insurer
under a mean-variance criterion. Therefore, the excess-of-loss reinsurance policy is
indeed optimal within the combined class of type I and type II reinsurance policies.
However, whether the excess-of-loss reinsurance policy is the optimal form among
all possible policies remains an open question to be investigated.
Remark 6.3.3 One sees from the proof of Theorem 6.3.2 (Theorem 6.3.3 resp.)
that if the insurer is allowd to acquire new reinsurance business on the same risk,
that is, if pt > 1 is allowed; then the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy under
the class of type I (type II resp.) policies is (m^t ; 0; ^

t ) (( ~m

t ;+1; ~t ) resp.), where
m^t and ^

t are given in (6.11) ( ~m

t and ~

t are given in (6.15) resp.). In other
words, the optimal reinsurance form within the combined class of type I and type II
policies is ~l (Zt; t) = ~mt ; a reinsurance strategy independent of the claim size, if the
restriction on acquiring new reinsurance business is released. However, whether it
is reasonable to release the restriction remains debatable (at least to the author).
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6.4 Numerical Examples
Example 6.4.1 (Equilibrium strategies) In this example, we examine the sen-
sitivity of the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategies given in (6.11) to dif-
ferent parameters. Unless otherwise stated, the parameters are given by r = 0:05;
 = 0:1; 1 = 0:2; 2 = 0:3;  = 0:6;  = 0:5;  = 1; and T = 9: The corresponding
equilibrium strategy under the parameter setting is denoted by (m; ):
In Figure 6.1, we plot the impact of r on the reinsurance-investment strategy.
Both m and  are decreasing (except for m at t = T where it is a constant)
as the risk-free rate increases. When large claims occur, the insurer might end
up taking loans from banks to remain solvent. Thus, the insurer intends to un-
dertake less insurance risk as borrowing money becomes more costly. As with the
investment strategy, clearly a reasonable investment decision for the insurer is to
decrease the amount invested in the nancial market as the risk-free asset becomes
more attractive.
In Figure 6.2, we plot the impact of  on the reinsurance-investment strategy.
We see clearly that as the insurer becomes more risk averse, it intends to take less
insurance and nancial risk.
In Figure 6.3, we plot the impact of  on the reinsurance strategy. We see that
m increases as  increases. In other words, as the reinsurance policy becomes more
expensive, the insurer intends to undertake more insurance risk by increasing the
retention level.
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Figure 6.4. Impact of  (left), 1 (middle), and 2 (right) on :
In Figure 6.4, we plot the impact of , 1; and 2 on the investment strategy
respectively. First, we see from the left panel that as  increases,  decreases. This
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happens because the total volatility undertaken by the insurer increases. Second, we
see from the middle panel that as the insurance market becomes more volatile, the
amount invested in the nancial market should be decreased as there is a positive
correlation ( = 0:5) between the two markets. Finally, we see from the right panel
that as the nancial market becomes more volatile, the insurer intends to decrease
the amount invested in it.
Example 6.4.2 (Proportional vs excess-of-loss) In this example, we assume
that the basic surplus process follows a C-L model
dUt = cdt  d
N(t)X
i=1
Yi; U0 = u;
where fYig1i=1 is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ex-
ponential random variables with common survival function F (y) := e y, y > 0;
representing the amount of individual claims, and fNtgt0 is a Poisson process
with intensity  > 0 representing the number of claims, independent of fYig1i=1.
Applying equation (6.12) with v(dz) = F (dz) and 1 = 0; the corresponding value
function under the C-L model is given by
V1(t; x) = e
r(T t)x+ A1(t); (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R,
where
A1(t) =
Z T
t
(
(  r)2
22
+ er(T s)
"
(   )E [Y ] + 
Z 

e r(T s)
0
F (y)dy
#
 e2r(T s)
Z 

e r(T s)
0
y F (y)dy
)
ds:
Moreover, we have
Et;x1

Xu

T

= er(T t)x+ a1(t); (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R,
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where
a1(t) =
Z T
t
(
(  r)2
2
+ er(T s)
"
(   )E [Y ] + 
Z 

e r(T s)
0
F (y)dy
#)
ds;
and Vart;x1 (X
u
T ) =
2

 
Et;x1

Xu

T
  V1(t; x) : Other parameters are given by r =
0:05;  = 0:1; 2 = 0:3;  = 0:5; T = 1;  = 0:5;  = 0:6;  = 1 and  = 0:5:
Under the model, we compare the value function V1 with the value function under
the equilibrium proportional reinsurance V2 in, e.g., Zeng et al. [91]. We see from
the top panel in Figure 6.5 that V2 is dominated by V1 except at the boundary t = T;
where V1 = V2: In other words, the equilibrium proportional reinsurance policy is not
optimal when a larger class, i.e., the combined class of type I and type II reinsurance
policies, is available, and the optimal form is an excess-of-loss type policy. We
also see from the bottom panel in Figure 6.5 that when mean and variance are
viewed separately, compared to the equilibrium proportional reinsurance, though the
equilibrium excess-of-loss policy generates a higher terminal mean, the associated
terminal risk is also higher.
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Figure 6.5. Excess-of-loss vs proportional.
112
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks and Future
Research
The main contribution of this thesis is that it has relaxed the concept of ruin in
stochastic control problems by studying in drawdown setups (Chapter 3 and 4)
and a two-sided exit framework (Chapter 5), and subsequently provided explicit
solutions to those problems. Moreover, the in-length study provided deep insights
into the optimal controls and the associated value functions. The thesis can be
viewed as a rst-step movement in stochastic control of "exotic" ruin features in
the actuarial literature. It can be further extended but not limited to the following
research directions.
The rst direction is on relaxing the assumption on constant force of mortality.
For the sake of mathematical tractability, the random time horizon is assumed to be
exponentially distributed, i.e., the force of mortality is assumed to be a constant, for
problems studied in Chapters 35. A relaxation of the constant force of mortality
assumption usually comes with a sacrice in mathematical tractability (e.g., Moore
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and Young [74]). My research goal is thus to push the study to the boundary
on both directions, that is, nding a generalization as realistic as possible while
maintaining mathematical tractability. A future attempt is to consider a state
dependent force of mortality.
The second direction lies in decomposing a stochastic control problem in a draw-
down setup into sub-problems that are easier to solve in principle. For example, by
utilizing a perturbation approach, it is known that some drawdown related quanti-
ties can be bounded up and down by the product of a series of decomposed two-sided
exit quantities (e.g., Landriault et al. [60]). In the limiting case, the upper and lower
bounds converge to the corresponding drawdown quantity. Such decomposition is
particularly appealing given that the drawdown problem is not as well-studied and
understood as its related two-sided exit problems. When stochastic controls are
imposed on both sides, two open questions are of primary concern: (1) Will the
product of the optimized two-sided exit quantities converge in the limit to the op-
timized drawdown quantity? (2) If (1) is true, what is the relationship between the
optimal controls of the drawdown problem and the two-sided exit problems? The
research on this direction is meaningful as it potentially gives insights into draw-
down problems and provides an alternative way to tackle or approximate drawdown
problems by solving its related problems such as the two-sided exit problems.
The third direction is on measuring and controlling drawdown risks in insurance.
While drawdowns have been substantially analyzed and applied in the nancial in-
dustry with great success, the research of drawdowns in insurance have signicantly
lagged behind. Recently, developing drawdown-based insurance models (e.g., Lan-
driault et. al [59]) has drawn some attention. However, to the best of my knowledge,
few stochastic control problems in insurance have incorporated drawdowns as part
of the models. Thus, introducing drawdown-based features into existing optimal
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control problems in insurance, for instance, optimal dividend/reinsurance/capital
injection problems, is of both practical and theoretical interest, and will potentially
create a rich research eld.
Though being independent of the contribution of the other chapters, the nd-
ings in Chapter 6 are also very interesting as they raise the discussion on optimal
reinsurance form of insurance companies. In contrast to the common procedure of
studying a problem with a reinsurance control in a dynamic setting, i.e., assuming
a specic form of a reinsurance policy and subsequently investigating its optimal
value, Chapter 6 considered an optimal reinsurance form within a fairly general
class of reinsurance policies. The study can be further generalized in at least two
ways. The rst one is to search for an optimal reinsurance form within a larger class
of available reinsurance policies. The main challenge in this direction comes from
the mathematical di¢ culties. The second generalization is to model the optimal
reinsurance problem in a game theoretic framework. In reality, an insurance com-
pany cannot determine the optimal reinsurance without considering the objective
of the reinsurance company and vice versa. As a result, it is natural to consider the
bargain process as a noncooperative game and subsequently study the existence of
a equilibrium.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
We rst consider the case  2 (0; 1) : For an arbitrary  2 ; we dene a se-
quence of stopping time fngn2N with n = inf
n
t  0 : R t
0
2sds  n
o
. By applying
Itôs formula to the process e tf(W t ;M

t ) for t 2 [0; ;n], where ;n :=  ^ n,
and subsequently utilizing (4.1), we arrive at
e 

;nf(W ;n ;M

;n
)  f(w;m)
=  
Z ;n
0
e tf(W t ;M

t )dt+
Z ;n
0
e tfw(W t ;M

t )dW

t
+
1
2
Z ;n
0
e tfww(W t ;M

t )(dW

t )
2 +
Z ;n
0
e tfm(W t ;M

t )dM

t

Z ;n
0
e t fLf(W t ;Mt )  [s0    (1 W t =Mt )]g dt
+
Z ;n
0
e tfw(W t ;M

t )tW

t dBt: (7.1)
Since fMt gt0 is nondecreasing and fm(W t ;Mt ) < 0 by considtion (2), we deduce
that fm(W t ;M

t )dM

t  0 a.s.. Thus, the inequality in (7.1) holds. Taking the
conditional expectation Ew;m[] on both sides of (7.1) and invoking condition (3),
we obtain
Ew;m

e 

;nf(W ;n ;M

;n
) +
Z ;n
0
e t [s0    (1 W t =Mt )] dt

 f (w;m) ;
(7.2)
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for all  2 . Since f is assumed to be bounded, by the dominated convergence
theorem and condition (5), it follows that
Ew;m
Z ;n
0
e t [s0    (1 W t =Mt )] dt

 f (w;m) ;
for all  2 . Further, by conditions (4) and (6), there exists an admissible strategy
 such that the equality holds in (7.1) because dM

t = 0 a.s.. Moreover, by
condition (4), the equality in (7.2) also holds. In other words, we deduce that
f (w;m) = Ew;m
"Z ;n
0
e t

s0   
 
1 W t =M

t

dt
#
= sup
x2
Ew;m
Z ;n
0
e t [s0    (1 W t =Mt )] dt

= v(w;m):
For the case  = 1: Consider a set N : = f(w;m) 2 D : w 6= 0g : For an ar-
bitrary  2 ; 8 (w;m) 2 N ,  = +1 by (4.1). By utilizing a similar set of
arguments as in the case  2 (0; 1) ; we deduce that 8 (w;m) 2 N ,
f (w;m) = Ew;m
Z 1
0
e t

s0   
 
1 W t =M

t

dt

= sup
x2
Ew;m
Z 1
0
e t [s0    (1 W t =Mt )] dt

= v(w;m):
8 (w;m) 2 DnN , since we assume that 0 is an absorbing state, i.e., W t = 0;
8t  inf fs : Ws  0g ;
f (0;m) = E0;m
Z 1
0
e t [s0    (1)] dt

=
s0   (1)

:
Proof of Lemma 4.3.1
We rst show that equation (4.11) admits a unique solution in (1;1). Letting
 (x) :=
1  +
+    x
  1 +
1   
    +x
+ 1; (7.3)
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it is straightforward to verify that
x (x) =
(1  +) (    1)
+     (x
  2   x+ 2) > 0; x > 1.
Given that  (1) =  1 <    1 and limx!1  (x) = 0, it easily follows that (7.3)
admits a unique solution in (1;1).
Next, we show that equation (4.12) admits a unique solution in (0; 1). Cross-
multiplying (4.12) and subsequently multiplying each side of the resulting equation
by x1 
+   yield
L (x) := (s0   s1)H (x) + s1G (x) = 0; (7.4)
where H (x) := D1x1 
 
+D4x
1 ++D5, G (x) := D2x1 
+  +D3x 
 
+D6x
 + ;
and 8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
D1 =   (1  +)  10 < 0;
D2 = (1  ) (+    ) > 0;
D3 = (1  ) (    1) + < 0;
D4 = (1   )+ 10 > 0;
D5 =   (1  ) (+    ) < 0;
D6 =   (1  ) (+   1)   < 0:
(7.5)
Note that the above multiplication by x1 
+   will make the function L monotone
on (0; 1) which simplies the proof of the existence of a unique solution in (0; 1) to
(4.12). Since 1 > + > 0 >   and  2 (0; ) ; it is easy to see that limx#0 L (x) =
 1 and L (1) = (  ) s0 (+    ) > 0: Then, it su¢ ces to show that Lx > 0
on (0; 1) : Di¤erentiating H (x) yields
Hx (x) = D1
 
1    x   +D4  1  + x +
=
 
1  +  1    10 0x +   0x  

:
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Since 1 > + > 0 >   and 0 > 1 > x > 0, we deduce that Hx (x) > 0: It remains
to show that Gx (x) > 0 on (0; 1). By  2 (0; ), we have
Gx (x) = D2
 
1  +     x +   +D3     x 1   +D6   + x 1 +
> (1  )  +      1  +     x +  
+ (1  )  +
h 
1    x 1      1  + x 1 +i :
Further, since 1  +     = + r

> 

=   +; it follows that
Gx (x) > (1  )
  +  h +     x +      1    x 1   +  1  + x 1 +i :
Hence, to show Gx (x) > 0; it su¢ ces to show that, for any xed x 2 (0; 1) ; 
+     x (++ )    1    x (1+ ) +  1  + x (1++)  0;
which clearly holds by the convexity of  (u) := xu in u 2 R: Thus, Gx(x) > 0 on
(0; 1) : Therefore, (7.4) admits a unique solution  2 (0; 1) :
Next, we show that y dened in (4.10) is positive. Rearranging (4.12) yields
k1
k2
=
(s0   s1) + 


 
   +

s1 (+    ) + (s0   s1) +    (s0   s1)  +
;
where
k1 = ()
++  1G () ;
and
k2 = (  1) [
 
+   1  1        1+ 1 ]  1  +    10   1   + + 10

:
Since 1 > + > 0 >   and  2 (0; 1) ; we deduce that k1k2 < 0: Furthermore, by
(4.11) and  2 (0; 1) ; we can see that
k1   k2 / (  1)


  1
   
+ 1


+

  1
0
 
  
+ 1
0
+
< 0;
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where /means the relationship of positive proportionality. Thus, we deduce
k1 < 0 and
y =
(s0   s1) + 


 
   +

k1
> 0:
It follows that y, y0 = y=0; and y = y= are all well dened. Then, it is
straightforward to verify that (4.8) is the solution to (4.7).
Finally, we show that  ^ is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on [y0; y] :
Since  ^y (y) =    1 < 0; it remains to show that  ^ is strictly convex on [y0; y].
The second order derivative of  ^ is given by
 ^yy (y) =
8><>:
(1 +)(  1)
(+  )y0

y
y0
  2
 

y
y0
+ 2
; y 2 (y0; y);
d1

y
y
  2
+ d2

y
y
+ 2
; y 2 (y; y);
(7.6)
where
d1 =

(  1) (+   1)
y
  (s0   s1) 
+
y2

  (    1)
+     ;
d2 =

(  1) (    1)
y
  (s0   s1) 
 
y2

+ (+   1)
    + > 0:
Since 1 > + > 0 >   and y > y0 > 0; we deduce  ^yy (y) > 0 on (y0; y): For
y 2 (y; y); we rewrite (7.6) as
 ^yy (y) =

y
y
  2
J (y) ;
where
J (y) := d1 + d2

y
y
+  
:
Since Jy (y) = d2 (+    )

y
y
+   1
> 0 and y = y=, it remains to show
that
J (y) = d1 + d2
+  
 > 0:
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With some algebraic manipulations, one can check that
d1 + d2
+  
 > 0() D11 
 
 
1  
0 +D4
1 +
 
1 +
0 +
D5
1   > 0;
where D1; D4, and D5 are given in (7.5). Consider
Q (x) := D1x
1  1 
 
0 +D4x
1 +1 
+
0 +
D5
1   :
It remains to show that Q () > 0: By (7.5), it is easy to see that
Q (0) =
D5
1   < 0;
Q (1) =
  
1   > 0;
and
Qx (x) =
 
1  + (1   )(x +   x  ) > 0, x 2 (0; 1):
Thus, Q has a unique zero on (0; 1) ; denoted as x0, such that
Q (x0) = D1x
1  
0 
1  
0 +D4x
1 +
0 
1 +
0 +
D5
1   = 0: (7.7)
It remains to show that  > x0, and we prove this by utilizing the monotonicity of
H. Recall G (x) = D2x1 
+   +D3x 
 
+D6x
 + . It is straightforward to verify
that
G () = D2
1   +
 +D3
  
 +D6
 +
 / k1 < 0:
Since L () = (s0   s1)H () + s1G () = 0; it follows that
H () = D1
1  
 +D4
1 +
 +D5 > 0: (7.8)
On the other hand, we deduce from (4.11) that
1   > + 10 > 
  1
0 : (7.9)
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By (7.7), (7.9), and x0 2 (0; 1), we have
H (x0) = D1x
1  
0 +D4x
1 +
0 +D5
=    1    + 10   (1  )x1  0   x1 +0  < 0: (7.10)
It follows from (7.8), (7.10), and Hx (x) > 0 on (0; 1) that  > x0. The proof is
therefore complete.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2
First, we show that equation (4.26) admits a unique solution on ( 1; 0), de-
noted as x. Rearranging (4.26) yields
! (x) := K1 (A+ 1; B;x) +K2 (A;B;x) +K3x (A+ 1; B;x) = 0; (7.11)
where K1 =  

1 +
(+  ) 
  1
0 +
1  
(  +)+
+ 1
0

A

> 0; K2 =
(1 )

> 0 and
K3 =
(1 )

A > 0: By (3) of Lemma 4.4.1, we have
! (x) = (K1 +K3x) e
x (B   A  1; B; x) +K2ex (B   A;B; x) := e s' (s) ;
where s =  x and
' (s) = (K1  K3s)  (B   A  1; B; s) +K2 (B   A;B; s) :
Since ' (0) = K1 +K2 > 0 and lims!1 ' (s) =  1; it su¢ ces to show that ' (s)
is decreasing on (0;1) : By (1) of Lemma 4.4.1, we rewrite ' as
' (s) = K1 (p  1; q; s) +K2 (p; q; s)
 K3 (q   1) [ (p  1; q   1; s)   (p  2; q   1; s)] ; (7.12)
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where p := B   A 2 (1; 2) and q := B > 1: By (2) of Lemma 4.4.1, we have
's (s) =
p  1
q
K1 (p; q + 1; s) +K2
p
q
 (p+ 1; q + 1; s)
 K3 [(p  1) (p; q; s)  (p  2) (p  1; q; s)]
=
p  1
q
K1 (p; q + 1; s) +K2

p  q
q
 (p; q + 1; s) +  (p; q; s)

 K3 [(p  1) (p; q; s)  (p  2) (p  1; q; s)] :
Therefore, showing 's < 0 is equivalent to showing 8s > 0;
K1 <
(2  p) q
p  1 K3
 (p  1; q; s)
 (p; q + 1; s)
+
(K3 (p  1) K2) q
p  1
 (p; q; s)
 (p; q + 1; s)
+
q   p
p  1K2:
(7.13)
It is easy to verify that K3 (p  1) = K2: Thus, (7.13) becomes
K1 < K3

(2  p) q
p  1
 (p  1; q; s)
 (p; q + 1; s)
+ q   p

; 8s > 0:
With some tedious calculations, one can verify that (p 1;q;s)
(p;q+1;s)
is a decreasing function
in s with
min
s>0
 (p  1; q; s)
 (p; q + 1; s)
=
p  1
q
:
Thus, it remains to show that
K1 < K3(2  p+ q   p): (7.14)
Since 0 2 (1;1) and   < 0; we have   10 < 1: With some further algebraic
manipulations, we can verify that

  1
0 < 1() K1 < K3 [2  p+ (q   p) (1  )] :
Thus, (7.14) holds as  < 1 and q p = A > 0. Therefore, ' (s) admits a unique zero
on (0;1) denoted as s, and equivalently, (7.11) admits a unique zero x =  s
on ( 1; 0).
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It follows that  =  s1 (x) 1 and 0 = =0 are well dened, where 0 is
dened in Lemma 4.3.1. Then, it is straightforward to verify that (4.25) is the
solution to (4.23).
Finally, we show that 	^ is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on (0;1) :
Note that 	^(y) for y 2 [0; ] has the same form as  ^(y) in Lemma 4.3.1 for
y 2 [y0; y]. Thus it su¢ ces to show the monotonicity and convexity of 	^ on
(;1). For y 2 (;1) ;
	^y (y) =  C3Ay A 1
 
A+ 1; B; s1 (y) 1

;
where
C3 =
()
A+1 (1  )
A
 
A+ 1; B; s1 () 1
 > 0:
Since limy!1 	^y (y) = 0, it remains to show that 	^ is convex on (;1) : The
second order derivative of 	^ is given by
	^yy (y) = C3A (A+ 1) y
 A 2
 
A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1
 /   A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1 :
By (3) of Lemma 4.4.1 and let s := s1 (y)
 1 ;

 
A+ 2; B; s1 (y) 1

= e s (B   A  2; B; s) = e s (p  2; q; s) :
Since p  2 2 ( 1; 0), we deduce that
d
ds
 (p  2; q; s) = d
ds
1X
i=0
(p  2)i
qi
si
i!
=
1X
i=1
(p  2)i
qi
si 1
(i  1)! < 0;
i.e.,  (p  2; q; s) is decreasing in s with
 (p  2; q; 0) = 1 and lim
s!1
 (p  2; q; s) =  1:
Thus,  (p  2; q; s) admits a unique zero s on (0;1) : To show 	^yy(y) > 0 for
y 2 (;1), it su¢ ces to show that s1 () 1 < s. Recall '(s) dened in (7.12)
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is a decreasing function on (0;1), and ' (s) admits a unique zero s =  x =
s1 ()
 1. Thus, it remains to show that '(s) < '(s) = 0. By (2) of Lemma
4.4.1, we have
(2  p) (p  1; q; s) + (q   1) (p  2; q   1; s) = (1  p+ q) (p  2; q; s) = 0:
(7.15)
and
(p  q) (p  1; q; s) + (q   1) (p  1; q   1; s) = (p  1) (p; q; s) : (7.16)
By (7.14), the relation K2 = (p  1)K3, (7.15), and (7.16), one obtains
' (s) = K1 (p  1; q; s) +K2 (p; q; s)
 K3 (q   1) [ (p  1; q   1; s)   (p  2; q   1; s)]
< K3(2  p+ q   p) (p  1; q; s) +K3(p  1) (p; q; s)
 K3(q   1) (p  1; q   1; s) +K3(q   1) (p  2; q   1; s)
= K3 [(q   p) (p  1; q; s) + (p  1) (p; q; s)  (q   1) (p  1; q   1; s)]
= 0:
The proof is therefore complete.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1
The general solution to the rst equation in (5.17) is known to be of the form
^ (y) = c1y
+ + c2y
  + c3y; (7.17)
where  =
 ( r )
p
( r )2+4
2
. Substituting (7.17) (and its rst two deriva-
tives) into the rst equation of (5.17) yields
0 = y [(   )m  rc3] + c1y+ [+(+   1) + (  r)+   ]
+ c2y
  [ (    1) + (  r)    ]
= y [(   )m  rc3] ;
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for any y 2 (yb; y0), from where we deduce
c3 =
(   )m
r
: (7.18)
Furthermore, by the boundary conditions in (5.17), we have8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
c1+y
+ 1
0 + c2 y
  1
0 +
( )m
r
= 0;
c1y
+
0 + c2y
 
0 +
( )m
r
y0 = 0;
c1+y
+ 1
b + c2 y
  1
b +
( )m
r
=  b;
c1y
+
b + c2y
 
b +
( )m
r
yb + byb = 1:
(7.19)
Solving for c1 and c2 using the rst two equations of (7.19) (and the last two
equations of (7.19) for the second equality sign), we obtain8><>:
c1 =
( )m(1  )
r(+  ) y
1 +
0 =
 r  [( )m+rb](1  )yb
r(+  )y+b
> 0;
c2 =
( )m(+ 1)
r(+  ) y
1  
0 =
r+ [( )m+rb](+ 1)yb
r(+  )y b
> 0:
(7.20)
Let  := y0
yb
2 (1;+1). It follows from (7.20) that8<: (   )m(1   )1 + =
 r 
yb
  [(   )m+ rb] (1   );
(   )m(+   1)1   = r+yb   [(   )m+ rb] (+   1):
(7.21)
Eliminating the term yb from the above system of equations yields the following
equation of :
f () :=
1   
 
1 + +
+   1
+
1     +    
+ 
(   )m  rb
(   )m = 0: (7.22)
Since + > 1 > 0 >  , it is straightforward to verify that f is a strictly increasing
function on [1;+1) with f (1) = (+  )rb
+ ( )m < 0 and lim"+1 f () = +1. There-
fore, (7.22) admits a unique solution  2 (1;+1). Substituting (7.18) and (7.20)
into (7.17) yields
^ (y) =
(   )my
r
"
1   
+    

y
y0
+ 1
  1  +
+    

y
y0
  1
  1
#
; yb  y  y0;
(7.23)
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where y0 = yb and yb can be determined from either equation in (7.21). By (7.22),
it is easy to see that since + > 1 > 0 >   and  > 1,
1
yb
=
(1  +)
r+

(   )m  rb  (   )m1  
>
(1  +)
r+

(   )m  rb  (   )m(   )m  rb
(   )m

= 0:
Thus, yb > 0.
Moreover, from (7.23) it is easy to verify that ^ is strictly convex on [yb; y0]. In
addition, by the boundary condition ^y (y0) = 0 and ^y (yb) =  b, we deduce that
^ is strictly decreasing on [yb; y0].
Proof of Theorem 5.3.2
By (5.22) and Lemma 5.3.1, it follows that
x
xx
=  I ( x) ^yy (I( x))
=
 (   )m (+   1) (1   )
r(+    )
"
+

I( x)
y0
+ 1
   

I( x)
y0
  1#
.
(7.24)
Substituting (7.24) into (5.14) immediately leads to (5.23) and (5.24). As for the
value function  +, it follows from Lemma 5.3.2, (5.21) and (5.18) that
 + (x) = ^ (I( x)) + xI( x)
= ^ (I( x))  ^y (I( x)) I( x)
=
(   )m(1   )(1  +)
r(+    ) I( x)
"
I( x)
y0
+ 1
 

I( x)
y0
  1#
:
Moreover, q+ and 

+ are bounded in [0; b] since both functions are continuous in
the compact set [0; b] : Thus, (q+; 

+) is admissible as conditions 1)3) in Denition
5.2.1 are satised.
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Proof of Lemma 5.3.3
The proof of Lemma 5.3.3 is similar to that of Lemma 5.3.1. Thus, we will skip
some tedious calculations.
The general solution to the rst equation in (5.30) is known to be given by
(7.17). Substituting (7.17) (and its rst two derivatives) into the rst equation of
(5.30) yields
c3 =
(   )m
r
: (7.25)
Furthermore, the boundary conditions of (5.30) implies8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
c1+~y
+ 1
0 + c2 ~y
  1
0 +
( )m
r
= 0;
c1~y
+
0 + c2~y
 
0 +
( )m
r
~y0 = 1;
c1+~y
+ 1
b + c2 ~y
  1
b +
( )m
r
= b;
c1~y
+
b + c2~y
 
b +
( )m
r
~yb   b~yb = 0:
(7.26)
In what follows, we consider the two cases b < ( )m
r
and b = ( )m
r
separately.
(1) For b < ( )m
r
, by (7.26), we obtain8><>:
c1 =
 r  m(1  )( )~y0
r(+  )~y+0
= (1  )[rb ( )m]
r(+  ) ~y
1 +
b ;
c2 =
r+ m(+ 1)( )~y0
r(+  )~y 0
= (+ 1)[rb ( )m]
r(+  ) ~y
1  
b :
(7.27)
Note that c1; c2 < 0. Let ~ :=
~y0
~yb
2 (1;+1). It follows from (7.27) that8<: (1   ) [rb  (   )m] ~+ 1~y0 +m(1   )(   )~y0 =  r ;(+   1) [rb  (   )m] ~  1~y0 +m(+   1)(   )~y0 = r+: (7.28)
From (7.28), it follows that ~ shall satisfy
f(~) := [(   )m  rb] +(1   )~+ 1 +  (+   1)~  1+(+  )( )m = 0:
(7.29)
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Since b < ( )m
r
and + > 1 > 0 >  , it is not di¢ cult to show that f is a strictly
increasing function on [1;+1) with f (1) =  rb(+    ) < 0 and lim~"+1 f(~) =
+1. Thus, (7.29) admits a unique solution ~ 2 (1;+1). Substituting (7.25) and
(7.27) back into (7.17) yields
^ (y) =
[rb  (   )m]y
r
"
1   
+    

y
~yb
+ 1
+
+   1
+    

y
~yb
  1
  (   )m
(   )m  rb
#
;
(7.30)
for y 2 [~yb; ~y0], where ~y0 can be determined from either equation in (7.28), and
~yb = ~y0=~. By (7.29), it is easy to see that since + > 1 > 0 >  , ~ > 1 and
b < ( )m
r
;
1
~y0
=
(+   1)
r+

(rb  (   )m) ~  1 + (   )m
>
(+   1)
r+

(rb  (   )m) (   )m
(rb  (   )m) + (   )m

> 0:
Hence, ~y0 > 0.
Moreover, from (7.30) one can show that ^ is strictly concave on [~yb; ~y0]. In
addition, by the boundary conditions ^y (~yb) = b and ^y (~y0) = 0, we deduce that
^ is strictly increasing on [~yb; ~y0].
(2) For b = ( )m
r
, (7.26) reduces to8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
c1+~y
+ 1
0 + c2 ~y
  1
0 +
( )m
r
= 0;
c1~y
+
0 + c2~y
 
0 +
( )m
r
~y0 = 1;
c1+~y
+ 1
b + c2 ~y
  1
b = 0;
c1~y
+
b + c2~y
 
b = 0:
(7.31)
From the last two equations, we deduce that c1~y
+
b = c2~y
 
b = 0. This further
implies c2 = 0 and ~yb = 0. Moreover, the rst two equations of (7.31) yield
~y0 =
r+
(+   1)(   )m > 0; c1 =  
(   )m
r+~y
+ 1
0
< 0:
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Substituting c1; c2; c3 into (7.17), we obtain
^ (y) =  (   )my
r
"
1
+

y
~y0
+ 1
  1
#
; y 2 [0; ~y0]: (7.32)
From (7.32) and the boundary conditions ^y (~y0) = 0 and ^y (0) = b, it is straight-
forward to verify that ^ is strictly concave and strictly increasing on [0; ~y0].
Proof of Theorem 5.3.4
Given that
 (x) = sup
y2[~yb;~y0]
n
^ (y)  xy
o
= ^ (I(x))  xI(x); (7.33)
where I(x) = ^
 1
y (x) for x 2 (0; b), we deduce that x (x) = I(x) and xx (x) =
1=^yy (I(x)). Using (7.17), it follows that
x(x)
xx(x)
= I(x)^yy (I(x))
= c1+(+   1)I(x)+ 1 + c2 (    1)I(x)  1. (7.34)
Note that for the case b = ( )m
r
; I(x) can be explicitly expressed as
I(x) = ^
 1
y (x) = ~y0

(   )m  rx
(   )m
 1
+ 1
; x 2 (0; b):
Substituting (7.34) into (5.28) together with the expressions for c1 and c2 in the
proof of Lemma 5.3.3 yield the corresponding expressions of q  and 

  for both
cases: b < ( )m
r
and b = ( )m
r
. Moreover, the expression of the value function
 (x) can be obtained immediately from the second equation of (7.33) and the
expression of ^ () in Lemma 5.3.3. Finally, q  and   are bounded in [0; b] since
both functions are continuous in the compact set [0; b] : Thus, (q ; 

 ) is admissible
as conditions 1)3) in Denition 5.2.1 are satised.
Proof of Theorem 6.3.1
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Let u 2 U be a strategy that satises conditions (1) and (2) in Theorem 6.3.2.
We rst show that g(t; x) = Et;x[Xu

T ]: By condition (2) of Theorem 6.3.2, i.e.,
Aug(t; x) = 0 for all (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R, and Dynkins formula, we obtain
Et;x[g(T;Xu

T )] = g(t; x) + Et;x
Z T
t
Aug(s;Xs)ds

= g(t; x);
where Au is dened in equation (6.6). By the second equation in condition (3) of
Theorem 6.3.2, i.e., g(T; x) = x for all x 2 R; we further obtain
g(t; x) = Et;x[g(T;Xu

T )] = Et;x[Xu

T ]:
Next, we show that V (t; x) = Ju

(t; x). Since (6.7) attains its supremum at
u 2 U , and Aug(t; x) = 0; (6.7) can be rewritten as
0 = AuV (t; x)  
2
Aug2(t; x); (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R. (7.35)
It follows from the rst equation in condition (3) of Theorem 6.3.2, i.e., V (T; x) = x
for all x 2 R, and Dynkins formula that
Et;x[Xu

T ] = Et;x[V (T;Xu

T )] = V (t; x) +
Z T
t
AuV (s;Xs)ds: (7.36)
Substituting (7.35) into (7.36) yields
V (t; x) = Et;x[Xu

T ] 

2
Z T
t
Aug2(s;Xs)ds: (7.37)
Since g (T; x) = x and again by Dynkins formula, we have
Et;x[(Xu

T )
2] = Et;x[g2(T;Xu

T )] = g
2(t; x) +
Z T
t
Aug2(s;Xs)ds
=
 
Et;x[Xu

T ]
2
+
Z T
t
Aug2(s;Xs)ds;
or equivalently,
Vart;x[X
u
T ] =
Z T
t
Aug2(s;Xs)ds: (7.38)
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Finally, substituting (7.38) into (7.37) yields
V (t; x) = Et;x[Xu

T ] 

2
Vart;x[X
u
T ] = J
u(t; x): (7.39)
The remaining work is to show that u 2 U is an equilibrium strategy dened
in Denition 6.2.2. For any " > 0 and t 2 [0; T ], consider the strategy u" dened
in Denition 6.2.2, i.e.,
u"s =
8<: u; t  s < t+ ";us; t+ "  s < T;
where u := ( m; p; ) is an arbitrary constant strategy. By the denition of Ju(t; x)
in (6.5) and the fact that g(T; x) = x, we have
Et;x[Ju
"
(t+ ";X ut+")]  Ju
"
(t; x)
= Et;x

Et+";X ut+"
h
Xu

T  

2
(Xu

T )
2
i
+

2

Et+";X ut+" [X
u
T ]
2
  Et;x
h
Xu
"
T  

2
(Xu
"
T )
2
i
  
2
 
Et;x[Xu
"
T ]
2
=

2
Et;x

Et+";X ~ut+" [X
u
T ]
2
  
2

Et;x
h
Et+";X ~ut+" [X
u
T ]
i2
=

2
Et;x

g2(t+ ";X ut+")
  
2
 
Et;x

g(t+ ";X ut+")
2
: (7.40)
It follows from (7.39), (7.40) and the denition of u" that
Ju
"
(t; x) = Et;x[Ju
"
(t+ ";X ut+")] 

2
Et;x

g2(t+ ";X ut+")

+

2
 
Et;x

g(t+ ";X ut+")
2
= Et;x[V (t+ ";X ut+")] 

2

Et;x

g2(t+ ";X ut+")
  g2(t; x)	
+

2
f  Et;x g(t+ ";X ut+")2   g2(t; x)g: (7.41)
For any u 2 U , " > 0 and  2 C1;2([0; T ] R), dene an operator
Au"(t; x) = Et;x[(t+ ";Xut+e)]  (t; x): (7.42)
144
By the denition of Au; we have
lim
"#0
1
"
Au"(t; x) = Au(t; x): (7.43)
By (7.42), we can rewrite (7.41) as
Ju
"
(t; x) = V (t; x)+Au"V (t; x) 

2
Au"g2(t; x)+

2
n 
Et;x

g(t+ ";X ut+")
2   g2(t; x)o :
(7.44)
By Dynkins formula, we conclude that
Et;x[g(t+ ";X ut+")] = g(t; x) + Et;x
Z t+"
t
Aug(s;Xs)ds

: (7.45)
Substituting (7.45) into (7.44) yields
Ju
"
(t; x) = V (t; x)+Au"V (t; x) 

2
Au"g2(t; x)+g(t; x)Et;x
Z t+"
t
Aug(s;Xs)ds

+o("):
(7.46)
On the other hand, since u is an arbitrary strategy,
AuV (t; x)  
2
Aug2(t; x) + g(t; x)Aug(t; x)  0: (7.47)
It follows from (7.47) and (7.43) that
Au"V (t; x) 

2
Au"g2(t; x) + g(t; x)Et;x
Z t+"
t
Aug(s;Xs)ds

 o("): (7.48)
Substituting (7.48) into (7.46) together with the fact that V (t; x) = Ju

(t; x), we
obtain
Ju
"
(t; x)  Ju(t; x) + o(");
which further implies
lim inf
"#0
Ju

(t; x)  Ju"(t; x)
"
 0:
Therefore, u is an equilibrium strategy.
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Proof of Theorem 6.3.2
We verify that given u^; V^ ; and g^ dened respectively in (6.11), (6.12), and
(6.13), condition (1)(3) in Theorem 6.3.1 are satised. For ease of notations, we
rewrite V^ and g^ in the following form, i.e.,8<: V^ (t; x) = A (t)x+ A (t) ; A (T ) = 1; A (T ) = 0;g^ (t; x) = a (t)x+ a (t) ; a (T ) = 1; a (T ) = 0; (7.49)
and subsequently denote A(t); A (t), a(t); and a(t) by A; A; a; and a; and their rst
order derivative by At; At; at and at; respectively. By expanding Au using (6.6),
together with some simplications, we rewrite the function on the right-hand side
of (6.7) as
L^(m^; p^; ^) := V^t (t; x) +

C^ +
Z 1
0
l^ (z; t) v (dz)

V^x(t; x)
+
1
2
 
21 + 2^12 + ^
222

V^xx(t; x)
+
Z 1
0

V^

t; x  l^ (z; t)

  V^ (t; x)

v (dz)
  
2
 
21 + 2^12 + ^
222

g^2x (t; x)
  
2
Z 1
0
h
g^

t; x  l^ (z; t)

  g^ (t; x)
i2
v (dz) ; (7.50)
where l^(t; z) is dened in (6.10) and
C^ = rx+ (  r) ^ + (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
l^ (z; t) v (dz) :
By utilizing (7.49), we further rewrite (7.50) as
L^(m^; p^; ^) =  
2
 
21 + 2^12 + ^
222

a2 +
Z 1
0
a2l^2 (z; t) v (dz)

+Atx+ At + C^v (dz)A: (7.51)
By (6.10), we further haveZ 1
0
l^ (z; t) v (dz) =
Z m^
0
zv (dz) + m^ (1  p^)
Z 1
m^
v (dz) + p^
Z 1
m^
zv (dz) ; (7.52)
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andZ 1
0
l^2 (z; t) v (dz)
=
Z m^
0
z2v (dz) + [m^ (1  p^)]2
Z 1
m^
v (dz) + p^2
Z 1
m^
z2v (dz) + 2m^ (1  p^) p^
Z 1
m^
zv (dz) :
(7.53)
By substituting (7.52) and (7.53) into (7.51) and subsequently applying the rst
order condition respectively to m^; p^ and ^, we obtain the following system of
equations, i.e.,
8>>><>>>:
m^ = A
a2
  p^
R1
m^ (z m^)v(dz)R1
m^ v(dz)
;
p^ =

A
a2
  m^
 R1
m^ (z m^)v(dz)R1
m^ (z m^)2v(dz)
;
^ = ( r)A
22a
2   12 :
(7.54)
We claim that m^ = A
a2
and p^ = 0 is the unique solution to the rst two equations
in (7.54). To see this, suppose that
p^ =

A
a2
  m^
 R1
m^
(z   m^) v (dz)R1
m^
(z   m^)2 v (dz) 6= 0;
then m^ is a solution toZ 1
m^
(z   m^)2 v (dz)
Z 1
m^
v (dz) =
Z 1
m^
(z   m^) v (dz)
2
: (7.55)
We next prove that (7.55) does not admit a solution on [0;1): Let
f^ (x) =
Z 1
x
(z   x)2 v (dz)
Z 1
x
v (dz) 
Z 1
x
(z   x) v (dz)
2
; x 2 [0;1):
Since f^ (0) > 0, lim
x!1
f^ (x) = 0; and
f^x (x) =
Z 1
x
 2 (z   x) v (dz)
Z 1
x
v (dz)  v (x)
Z 1
x
(z   x)2 v (dz)
  2
Z 1
x
(z   x) v (dz)
Z 1
x
( 1) v (dz)
=  v (x)
Z 1
x
(z   x)2 v (dz) < 0; x 2 (0;1);
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f^ does not admit a zero on [0;1); i.e., a solution to (7.55) does not exist on [0;1).
Thus,
u^ =

A
a2
; 0;
(  r)A
22a
2
  1
2

=



e r(T t); 0;
(  r)
22
e r(T t)   1
2

is the unique solution to (7.54). By a second derivative test, it is straightforward
to show that the supremum of L^ is attained at u^. By substituting u^ into (7.51)
and using (6.12), it is straightforward to verify that the supremum is equal to 0;
i.e., condition (1) in Theorem 6.3.1 is satised.
By expanding Au using (6.6) and using g^ in (7.49), we have for any (t; x) 2
[0; T ] R,
Aug^(t; x) = atx+at+

rx+ (  r) ^ + (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
l^ (z; t) v (dz)

a:
(7.56)
Substituting u^ into (7.56) and utilizing the form of a and a yields Au^ g^(t; x) = 0;
i.e., condition (2) in Theorem 6.3.1 is satised.
Finally, one sees directly from (7.49) that V^ (T; x) = x and g^ (T; x) = x; i.e.,
condition (3) in Theorem 6.3.1 is satised. Thus, by Theorem 6.3.1, u^ is the
equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy and V^ is the corresponding equilibrium
value function. Furthermore, Et;x[X u^

T ] = g^(t; x): The proof is therefore completed.
Proof of Theorem 6.3.3
We verify that given ~u; ~V ; and ~g dened respectively in (6.15), (6.16), and
(6.17), condition (1)(3) in Theorem 6.3.1 are satised. Since for any (t; x) 2
[0; T ]R, ~V (t; x) = V^ (t; x) and ~g(t; x) = g^(t; x); by using a similar set of arguments
as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.2, we rewrite the function on the right-hand side of
(6.7) as
~L( ~m; ~p; ~) = Atx+ At+ ~CA  
2
 
21 + 2~12 + ~
222

a2  
2
Z 1
0
a2~l2 (z; t) v (dz) ;
(7.57)
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where
~C = rx+ (  r) ~ + (   )
Z 1
0
zv (dz) + 
Z 1
0
~l (z; t) v (dz) :
Furthermore, by (6.14) we haveZ 1
0
~l (z; t) v (dz) =
Z ~m
~p
0
~pzv (dz) + ~m
Z 1
~m
~p
v (dz) ; (7.58)
and Z 1
0
~l2 (z; t) v (dz) =
Z ~m
~p
0
~p2z2v (dz) + ~m2
Z 1
~m
~p
v (dz) : (7.59)
By substituting (7.58) and (7.59) into (7.57) and subsequently applying the rst
order condition respectively to ~m, ~p and ~, we obtain that8>>><>>>:
A
R1
~m
~p
v (dz)  a2 ~m R1~m
~p
v (dz) = 0;
 a2~p R ~m~p0 z2v (dz) + A R ~m~p0 zv (dz) = 0;
~  

( r)B
22b
2   12

= 0:
(7.60)
Solving the rst equation in (7.60) yields ~m = A
a2
: Let ~f(~p) :=  a2~p R ~m~p0 z2v (dz)+
A
R ~m
~p
0 zv (dz) : It is straightforward to verify that given ~m = ~m
;8<: ~f(1) =  a
2
R ~m
0
z(z   ~m)v(dz) > 0;
~f~p(~p) =  a2
R ~m
~p
0 z
2v (dz) < 0; ~p 2 (0; 1]:
Thus, ~f(~p) > 0 for all ~p 2 (0; 1]: In other words, a critical point of ~L does not exist
on [0;1) (0; 1] R. The supremum ~L is then attained at
~u =

A
a2
; 1;
(  r)A
22a
2
  1
2

=



e r(T t); 1;
(  r)
22
e r(T t)   1
2

:
Then it is straightforward to verify that
sup
~u2U
~L ( ~m; ~p; ~) = ~L ( ~m; ~p; ~) = L^ (m^; p^; ^) = 0;
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A~u~g(t; x) = Au^ g^(t; x) = 0;
~V (T; x) = x, and ~g(T; x) = x; i.e., conditions (1)(3) in Theorem 6.3.1 are satis-
ed. Thus, by Theorem 6.3.1, ~u is the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy
and ~V is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Furthermore, Et;x

X ~u

T

=
~g(t; x): The proof is therefore completed.
150
